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SPECULATIVE SKETCH
OF
EUROPE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF
MONSIEUR DUMOURIEZ.

TO WHICH ARE PREFIXED
STRICTURES
UPON THE CHAPTER RELATIVE TO
GREAT BRITAIN.

Eruit edificat mutat quadrata rotundis.

HOR.

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P R E F A C E.

HISTORY affords no example of events so extraordinary, so important to the human race, as those which have given birth to the following Speculative Sketch.

In 1797, the fate of Nations was decided by a single individual, and changed in an instant by his arbitrary nod.

Extraordinary Men dart through the orbits of revolving centuries like comets, and baffle the Political Astronomer to calculate their effects. Man takes their eccentric journeys for aberrations, till the amazing effects of these phenomena, prove them to have appeared at the command of Providence, whose Decrees are equally absolute and incomprehensible.

Before the preliminary Treaty of Leoben was signed, Buonaparte might, notwithstanding his heroic genius, have been shut up and famished among the Mountains of Styria ;

cut off from Italy, and forced, should he again enter it, to recommence its conquest, by passing over the bodies of the confederated Austrians and Venetians. Neither the talents nor the courage of this extraordinary General could have extricated him from this formidable crisis, had not the propitious destiny of France excited in the Court of Vienna a salutary consternation; a panic that compelled the Emperor to conclude a precipitate Peace, when a fortnights delay would unavoidably have changed the face of his affairs.

The retreat of the courageous Arch-Duke Charles, to an impregnable post on the Danube, from whence he effectually protected Vienna, and the defensive preparations in that Capital well executed by General Mack, placed it in a state of security against the attack of Buonaparte.

That General was then menaced on either flank; by the army of the Tyrol on his left, and that of Hungarian Insurrection on his right. He was destitute of provisions and of money, and at a distance of near eighty leagues from Italy. With that country his communication was cut off by the loss of Trieste, and the general rising of the Venetians, for which they have been punished by the Austrians themselves.

The Venetian Army had become masters of Verona, whose fortresses alone were now occupied by a few French Troops: and these must

soon have surrendered to General Laudun. This General had already arrived there from the Tyrol, and had joined the Venetians, when he received the unexpected and fatal order to suspend all hostilities, and return to the Tyrol.

In fact, the Austrian Generals had so ill defended the passage of the Lahn, and of the Upper Rhine, that it might be expected the French would again advance as rapidly as in the preceding Year; that they would soon remove the Seat of War into the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria.

But even in that case the positions Generals Werneck and La Tour would have taken in their retreat, would by concentrating the War, have given a more united strength to the Arch-Duke Charles, who would thereby have been enabled to sustain their attack: an attack so much the more dangerous to the French, as they would have been at too great a distance from their frontiers: and would again have left four places of strength, as in their former incursion, between them and their supplies or line of retreat, in case of ill success.

The retreat of the Austrians from the Banks of the Rhine to the Danube, might have been executed without precipitation, and by false marches; but with whatever rapidity the French might advance from the Rhine to Bavaria, and the frontiers

of Bohemia, it would require more than a month to arrive near enough to Buonaparte to concert measures with him. On his part he could not have waited so long without being compelled to decide, either on retiring into Italy, in order to suppress the insurrection of the Venetians, or desperately to attack Vienna, and the Arch-Duke.

That Prince might have refused to risk a battle if he did not wish to expose the fate of the House of Austria, to the shock of desperation. As to Vienna, defended by the skillful General Mack, and an army of more than 30,000 men, and protected by the vicinity of that of Arch-Duke Charles, that City could not be suddenly taken by Buonaparte, without siege artillery, provisions, or money; with an army harrassed, weakened, surrounded on all sides, and whose communication with Italy, from whence he must derive his supplies and ammunition was entirely cut off.

1st. If he attacked that Capital by main force, it was an act of desperation that must, according to every probability, involve his total ruin. Had he been successful and entered the City, he would doubtless have done much mischief, but he would have been presently overpowered by the fresh Army of the Arch-Duke.

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2d. He could not attempt to retreat by Bavaria, in order to form a junction with General Moreau, because he would have had to traverse the Mountains, of the Archbishopric of Saltzburg, strongly defended by the Imperial Troops, whom the Arch-Duke might have reinforced as well as the division that defended the Tyrol.

3dly. If he was desirous to direct his retreat into Italy, he might have been intercepted by General Laudun, and the Venetians at Ponteba and the other passes of Carinthia. His right might have been turned by the Hungarian Army, and then vigorously pursued by the that which defended Vienna. His retreat would even have deprived him of the confidence of the Italians, as yet not well confirmed in their Revolution, and perhaps all the French Troops would have been massacred by those very Nations whom they had emancipated and armed.

One of these three alternatives he must necessarily have taken in less than a week, for he could not have continued longer in the same position, and had only one means to extricate himself : a means which he seized with an address that does him at least as much honor as the brilliant military exploits that placed him in so critical a situation. This measure was to take advantage of the consternation of the Court of Vienna,

Vienna, to hold out to it the irrefistible allurements of an important interest, and to negociate so advantageously for the Emperor, or to induce him to conclude an immediate Peace.

Never was a French Army so near the *Furcæ Caudinæ*; never did a General extricate himself with more address. The advantages granted by Buonaparte to the Emperor, in the Negociation of Leoben, were proportionate to the magnitude of his danger, and are a proof of its existence. But their motives were concealed behind the veil of mystery. The events that followed that preliminary treaty, have rendered those advantages still more considerable on either side.

It is vain to seek in these transactions, the principles of morality and universal justice, so pompously displayed, both in the foundations of the Constitution of the French Republic, and the emphatic Proclamations of Courts. The probity of Kings and Nations resembles not that of individuals; their policy has never altered, and will ever be the same.

The ancient, the feeble, the unfortunate Republic of Venice, has fallen a victim to the interest of Austria, and to the vengeance, whether just or otherwise, of the French Republic. Her death warrant was signed at Campo Formio. Dalmatia, several provinces
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of Terra Firma, Venice herself are become an advantageous indemnity for the Milanese, the Netherlands, and Upper Austria.

The cession of this last Province to the Duke of Modena, leaves a certainty of its future reintegration, by hereditary descent in the Austrian Dominions ; unless France ever attentive to remove so powerful a neighbour has stipulated by a secret article that it shall never revert to that power.

To the Duke of Modena's dominions, the Princess of Conti is heiress. All the property of the House of Bourbon is confiscated by the French. Modena will therefore be the property of that Republic. This system of jurisprudence is worthy of the present age, or rather it has existed in all periods. And thus it was, that Venice acquired the Kingdom of Cyprus.

Every thing is mysterious in a negociation where the contracting powers are reciprocally indemnified at the expence of others. The Empire has opened the Congress of Rastadt, without knowing what has already been fixed in its favor, or to its prejudice. And the different States constituting the Germanic body, confiding in the repeated Proclamations of their head and chief, have sent their Deputies to that Congress with full powers founded on the preservation of the integrity of the Empire.

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The French however soon withdrew a part of the veil that enveloped the mystery of their negotiations. The evacuation of Mentz by the Imperial troops precisely at the moment when the French were prepared to seize it, without allowing time either for the empire or its own sovereign to introduce a garrison and artillery to preserve this key of Germany, at least till the peace now negotiating at Rastadt should decide upon its fate, indisputably proves that its cession was stipulated before-hand by the Emperor.

All that part of the empire to the left of the Rhine clearly appears to be included in that cession, since the French, without waiting the result of the Congress at Rastadt, and without encountering any claim on that subject, so hastily divide this rich conquest into departments and municipalities, like the other territories of the great Republic.

The retreat of the Emperor's armies towards his hereditary dominions developes another mystery in the Negotiation of Campo Formio. The Archbishopric of Salzburg, and a part of the Bavarian successions appear to have been another compensation for the uncontested and even facilitated cession of Mentz, and all the left Bank; as Dalmatia and the Venetian State form the indemnity for recognizing the Cisalpine Republic, for
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Upper Austria, and the Austrian Netherlands.

This great Negotiation which affects the fate, the interests, and above all the opinion of Europe, conceals other mysteries that the result of the Congress of Rastadt will shortly bring to light. Although nothing is yet known beyond the Treaty of Campo Formio, although the Emperor is the only apparent Negotiator with the French Republic, there are other Powers who must, like him, be indemnified and compensated.

The Empire is like a dish waiting to assuage the avidity of several famished guests. It is on the eve of being carved out, and a morsel given to each according to his size and appetite. Let us not anticipate the minutiae of this political repast. Soon we shall behold new geographical partitions that will again change the extent, the power, the interests, the views, the causes of alliance and of enmity of the sovereignties that will constitute the European Republic at the end of the present century.

We shall take a hasty view of the probable influence of this territorial Revolution, and its ultimate effects on the powers that have not yet been mowed down by this moral as well as political Revolution.

Two events which offer themselves to our consideration will shortly enable us to unfold other mysteries in the policy of these
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conquerors,

conquerors, and of those powers who, fearing to oppose them, seek to be their gleaners. The first is the incorporation of the Bishopric of Basil in the French Republic, the protection granted to the Revolutionists of the Pays de Vaud, and the general revolutionisation of the Helvetic League.

The other is the war declared in fact by the Cisalpine Republic against the Pontifical Government, and the departure of Buonaparte, the Ambassador, after the popular commotion and tragical death of General Duphot. This event so contradictorily related by both parties cannot be judged of at this distance from its scene. But whatever was its real cause, the French Directory have decreed its revenge, and have charged their Army of Italy with its execution.

At the same time they are not inattentive to their particular interests. Commissaries were immediately sent off to seize the rest of the precious monuments of antiquity, and doubtless the rich plate of the churches of Rome. The French Army are about to coin money in the church of St. Peter to enable them to combat the heretics of England.

The following speculative sketch will represent the events relative to each country, whose political situation will be exhibited as resulting from the changes produced by the French Revolution, and from the inevitable influence and effects of this grand catastrophe.

All the books of jurisprudence, all the treaties, even the foundations of the politics, and balance of Europe, (though improperly so called) are now become mere objects of empty curiosity, no longer deserving to be studied or consulted, and may for ever be buried in the dust of immense libraries.

The tranquillity of the North was founded on the Treaty of Oliva in 1660. In 1770 the Great Frederick and the celebrated Catherine II. created for Poland a system of partition to which Austria was compelled to accede. The Treaty of Oliva has been annulled by this new system of policy so summary and so convenient, and Poland has been destroyed.

The tranquillity of the rest of the Empire was established on the basis of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The Treaty of Vienna in 1756, which united the Interests of the House of Austria with that of Bourbon, has destroyed that foundation and pledge of security to the Powers of Europe, has subjected France to the policy of Vienna, engaged her in expensive wars, and from consequence to consequence has ultimately produced the French Revolution.

The tranquillity of the seas and of the colonies of European powers was founded on the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. The revolt of the Americans, the alliance of Louis XVI. with that people have created another inde-
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pendent nation, inoculated France with the Revolutionary germ, and given a shock to commerce and to the colonies, whose ruin has been completed by philanthropy; that philanthropy whose dictates, although just in principle, have been grossly misunderstood, and more improperly applied by the Legislators of France.

Thus then have all the foundations of tranquillity, security, and property among nations been broken up; and the great Revolution begun in France in 1789 has completed the chaos. Could the Powers of Europe have remained mere spectators of this great event, its action would have been confined to France alone. Its effects would have been naturally slow; its influence on the rest of Europe almost insensible. It would even have been beneficial. For it would have been accompanied neither by crimes, by disorders, by massacres, nor by the wildest extravagancies of opinion.

But the system of partition has produced the war, and the same system now becomes the great medium of peace. For the French having had the fatal advantage of being always victorious, are now become a conquering nation. Forgetting the principles on which they grounded their Revolution, they have adopted the system of political partition in fashion all over Europe since the Year 1792.

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This example was given them by the heads of those very nations that cry out most loudly against the usurpative policy of the new Republicans. The late King of Prussia ceased combating the French, only to unite with Austria and Russia in the partition of Poland. Thus the ancient Sarmatians are effaced from the annals of the world, though not without the hope of again existing as a nation. Avengers of the liberty of Poland are forming in the Armies of the three partitioning Powers, and above all, in that of the celebrated Buonaparte. We may foresee that event though it is impossible yet to predict its epocha. But if the Revolutionary spirit continues thus to march with gigantic steps, it will not long be delayed. Till that event, however, arrive, we must, in this speculative sketch, entirely omit this people, since they cannot act a part among the nations of Europe.

STRICTURES

UPON THE

CHAPTER OF ENGLAND.

“ Je me charge de mes Ennemis : — Dieu me garde de
mes Amis.”

NOTWITHSTANDING the curiosity which must be excited by whatever comes from the pen of M. Dumouriez, the ingenuity with which he has traced out his “ Speculative Sketch of Europe,” and the general utility of its tendency, the influence under which the Chapter upon England is written, so dissimilar to that which operated upon the Author whilst discussing the interests of other nations, was a sufficient notice for withholding this Translation. The separate publication however of that very Chapter in an English dress, rendered it desirable that the work at large should be presented to the public, to enable it to form a judgment of its purport from the context, and not from a partial extract; but that while justice was done to the Author in that respect,

respect, what may be termed the libellous, and is doubtless the mischievous, part, his considerations upon this country should receive such animadversions as may counteract the effect it is calculated to produce. The impartial reviewer of the destinies of the other nations of Europe disappears from the instant in which the name of this country is pronounced. He sees in us nothing but a dispirited, exhausted, and half revolutionized people. He denies us in facts, that patriotism which he had admitted in words. He pronounces our fate to depend upon the resolves of two powers, which have each successively prostrated themselves at the feet of France, and have now withdrawn their Forces into the heart of Germany, while the doom of the Empire is subjected to the unbiassed consideration of a Diet, surrounded by French Armies, those Armies which, by occupying a far greater extent of that Empire than is now in dispute, have more than forestalled the event of its deliberations.

His "nationality," and a lingering grudge for a treatment, which he has even now sufficiently justified; appear to have born down his judgment, and confused his principles. Whilst he vilifies our resources and courage, and exalts that of the enemy, he proffers the guidance of his own experience, and far and justly famed military genius, to the enterprising spirit of the French Scipio; nor

when he offers the thunderbolt to the grasp of France, does he extend the Ægis, which might repel it, to the arm of her competitor. The hand, which drove the combined powers of Austria and Prussia from France, and was to have planted the tri-coloured flag on the Tower of London, now chalks out to a happier rival the track which he himself would fain have trod, and which he deems must lead to the summit of glory, and the empire of the world.

But if we disallow the truth of this picture of the internal state of Great Britain, should we not also consider how far the means of conquest, which he indicates, are adequate to the end in view? Were we the divided and distracted people which he paints, or were we immersed in that torpid lethargy which has betrayed some of the finest countries of Europe into the hands of the French, no means would be inadequate, the mere phantom of invasion alone would perhaps appal us into passive despair. But this high-minded people, now bursting forth into arms with enthusiastic patriotism, are not to be told that a race which their forefathers have so often made to fly before them, when once landed on our shores, is irresistible; and that whilst *un homme Roi* can effect the salvation of the Empire, whose frontier towns are actually occupied by the enemy,

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my, this *Populus Virorum*, this nation of men, is impotent to effect its own. The same motives however, which lead us to mistrust his candor whilst descanting on our destinies, should induce us to give him full credit where he views the chances of France in an unfavorable light. His arguments to prove that the Invasion must and will take place carry conviction with them; and if he, though living in retirement in a neutral country, proscribed by his own, and a stranger to the whirlwind of passions which agitate it, is, what may almost be termed sanguine about the success of the expedition; can we be surprised that the Directory, inflamed with the exaggerations of the most rancorous of our traitors, drunk with the blood and spoils of nations, and mad with the lust of universal sway, and still more mad with the workings of the deepest national envy and vindictiveness, should look down upon us as their inevitable and easy prey? We must be as certain that the attempt will be made, as we should be of the event of the attempt against a free and powerful people, armed almost to a man in their own defence, and with all hope of succour, all prospect of retreat irretrievably cut off from their enemy. If any other motive were wanting to those which have roused us to such manful exertions, where could a stronger one be found than in the picture M. Dumouriez

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traces as the inevitable consequences to France of the failure of this mighty effort. He promises us (and the blessing will come in spite of the prophet) a prompt and successful termination of the most tremendous struggle, which mankind ever witnessed or was engaged in, the triumph of right over wrong, of good over evil, the omen and the guarantee of well-earned glory, and permanent peace and prosperity to Britain.

Before we consider his ideas upon the practicability of a descent, let us cast a rapid eye over the observations upon the events of the War, which are introductory to them, and indeed are in part the basis upon which they rest.

M. Dumouriez tells us that in the naval struggle between the French and English, the glory of the former has been the more difficult to attain, and the most brilliant. We often hear that language is revolutionized; and truly this must be a specimen of it, unless he considers as glory the being beaten in every direction; if so, it is one we will not dispute with his countrymen; it has not been of very difficult attainment to them; and our unrevolutionized understandings can scarce conceive its brilliancy. This applies a little to his next remark, that if we bear off the palm of skill, we must yield that of courage to our Enemies. If he means, that our Sailors have not been worked up to the sum-

mit of their Valor, because the utmost efforts of their Enemy have been insufficient to drive them to the highest bent and desperation of it, and that he who is worsted must be the braver man, as having borne more and undergone such an excess of danger as to be driven from the fortitude which bore him up under it to intimidation and submission, we have nothing to say to his assertion. We can safely say however, that if France had directed her principal exertions to her Navy, (and she was too politic to do it) she would have spared us the necessity of maintaining an expensive Army on the Continent, and without obliging us to keep up a much larger force at Sea than we actually had, would have given a turn to the War—the most popular, the most economical, and the most advantageous to this country. The examples he cites, to shew how successfully she might have done it, do not prove much. Colbert, by giving to France all the advantages Nature held out to her Commerce, laid a foundation for a navy, which was imprudently connived at and suffered to accumulate by the mistaken and vicious policy of this Country. What Commerce had France in 1793?—The French Navy was so far from being augmented to eighty sail of the line *in the space of two years* by Lewis XVI. that it is notorious, it had been the object of the unremitting attention of the Government of that Country from 1763, the year of the Peace of Paris. But if a
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large portion of those Navies found their way into the British Ports, we might surely have looked forward to as large a share in the fruits of the labours of our Enemy in this War as in any preceding one.

We next find it stated vauntingly, that Richery destroyed the fisheries of Newfoundland ; that the French reconquered Corsica, and drove us out of the Mediterranean. Is there a syllable of this well founded ? This Admiral Richery, with six sail of the line, fell in with three of ours, and having taken one of them a French prize, which was in tow and under jury-masts, and had only such a complement of hands as was sufficient to navigate her, did not venture to approach the other two who braved his attack. He then suffered himself to be blocked up for a considerable time in the Harbour of Cadiz, by Admiral Mann with six sail of the line ; and when at length he contrived to steal out, the whole mischief he effected at Newfoundland was merely of a predatory nature ; he burnt a few boats and fishing stages at one of the out ports, but did not make the smallest attempt upon the principal settlement, or upon our naval force there, which consisted only of a fifty gun ship and three frigates, and which never quitted its station. The French Fleet was twice brought to a partial engagement with ours in the Mediterranean : in the first *,

* March 14, 1795.

they lost two line of battle Ships, and one in the second *. It was thus they drove us out of the Mediterranean, and reconquered Corsica, our relinquishment of which originated solely in the expence and precariousness of our connection with that fickle and faithless People, when Spain became our Foe, and when from the insignificance of the French Marine in that quarter we could venture to turn upon our new Enemies our whole force in those Seas. Our troops and frigates occupied Elba three months after Earl St. Vincents left the Mediterranean in quest of the Spaniards, in our operations against whom we experienced not the most trivial diversion from that Fleet at Toulon, of which M. Dumas asserts the re-establishment ; and our Squadron of Frigates occupied the Archipelago till after the Battle fought off Cape St. Vincents. If their Navy does begin to exist again at Brest, at least it has given as yet but little signs of life.

When we grant the possibility of a descent, must we equally admit the truth of those mortal apprehensions which he contends, our Government must feel, at seeing the attention of the French again turned to the Sea ? What Commerce will foster their Navy ? Of which of the qualities he attributes to his Countrymen are we destitute ?

* July 13, 1795.

and are there none which we possess exclusively? With what consciousness of preceding events, with what actual qualifications and pretensions to success, with what respective strength do the two Nations start anew for the palm?

We next learn that Toulon and Dunkirk, especially, have proved to us the invincibility of the French by land. He exclaims:

“*Sinite arma viris et cedite ferro.*”

Has the regeneration of the foe then been the signal for our degeneracy? The British Forces in Toulon, at no one time ever amounted in foldiers, sailors, and marines, to 3000 men. The defence of that place, which was commanded by heights on all sides, depended entirely upon that of those heights against a land attack. Our troops displayed repeatedly the most active gallantry in this warfare; a variety of circumstances impeded any unity of exertion in the motley garrison, which was made up of troops of various nations, some of whom were quite unused to War, and which had to struggle against a multiplicity of obstacles originating in the nature of its composition; and when the enemy, at length between 30 and 40,000 strong, broke through the line of defence, which necessitated the evacuation of the place, we know that he did not make his irruption through a British post. At Dunkirk the defeat of the covering army, whose cavalry was unable to act on

account of the nature of the country, and whose infantry was entirely composed of auxiliaries, alone occasioned the retreat of the British troops, after they had repulsed three sallies from the place, and borne down with the most brilliant courage the obstacles which the French had opposed, not only by land but by sea, to their sitting down before it. Nor did the enemy attempt the slightest interruption to that retreat. But did these “bis victi Phryges” perform not one achievement which might render this invincibility of their enemy in some degree problematical? If the consciousness of it existed any where, it must have been amongst our troops; and had it existed, Britain would not have had to boast of perhaps the brightest exploit of the war (since the question is merely of valor), the storming of Lincelles*; the heroic enterprise of the handful of men who turned the fortune of the battle of Tournay†; and the almost romantic prowess displayed by her cavalry on the plains near Cateau‡. This is not the first time that Mr. Dumouriez has shewn how much he is ready to do to keep as well as possible with the French armies; and one must really imagine that he composed this paragraph with the national cockade in his hat.

* 18th of August, 1793. † 22d of May, 1794.

‡ 24th and 25th of April, 1794.

The fate of this country is however, according to M. Dumouriez, to depend in all respects on the issue of the deliberations at Rastadt—If peace should be established between the Empire and France, our Commerce is to be utterly ruined. Our trade to Bremen, Hamburgh, the Baltic, and the whole of the North of Europe is at once to cease. Is it then to be a condition of Peace with the *Emperor*, that the ports of neutral States, Prussia, the Hanse Towns, Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, should be shut against us, the three last being independent of the Empire, and not parties to the Congress? When we lost the direct trade to France, it shifted to Flanders, from thence to Holland, and from thence to Hamburgh. Let us here imagine the case in which we should be excluded from the Hanse Towns; we should be put to the inconvenience of going to Ports a little further to the North. New ports may be opened to us on the Continent should war be renewed, but we have little to fear from further exclusions. If, however, in these strange and eventful times, the most improbable, and nearly impossible thing should happen, that the other Nations of Europe, great, powerful, and independent, as some of them are, should bend to the yoke of the tyrants, and become parties against the only Country, struggling to save itself and the world, and endeavor to exclude us from any Traffic with them, the blow would be far from mortal; not all the arrêtés of the Directory,

rectory, or the ordinances of the other Powers of Europe could prevent their people from supplying themselves from hence with articles indispensably necessary to them, and which they could get no where else; a necessity which is increased by every act of devastation committed by the Enemy. But if even (to take the extremest case) this assertion should turn out to be unfounded, we should still survive the effects of that disappointment. All our European exports are inconsiderable, when compared with those to the East and West Indies, and America. The exports of 1797 exceeded considerably those of the years 1794 or 1795 (which again exceeded the average of the latter years of the last Peace) and were scarcely, if at all, affected by the measures of the French, except in as far as we were injured by the distress and misery of the countries with which they fraternised. The excess of exports in 1796 beyond those of 1797 was owing to the unusual extent of orders received from the West Indies and N. America in the former year. The actually languishing state of our manufactures, in consequence of the exclusions alluded to, is best answered by the authentic statements recently laid before Parliament; but the folly of supposing our remittances from the Colonies are to be interrupted by the Privateers of the Enemy, so as to occasion real distress, is too extravagant even for a Frenchman. The captures of our unprotected Ships, the owners of whom chose that they should
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push for a market, without waiting for convoy, have, it is true, been numerous; but that harvest will very soon be cut off, if the Law, lately proposed *, to prevent the sailing of Merchantmen without convoy, should be ratified by the Legislature. The aliment of the piratical War will thus be cut off, and the Enemy will be deprived of the wealth which he derived from the adventurous spirit of our Merchants and Manufacturers. His Privateers, in which so much confidence is placed, will be rendered completely harmless; the maritime parts of France, which have been enriched by plunder, will become discontented; the Seamen will take to other employments; and the Directory will be deprived of almost the last resource of their Navy.

We now come to perhaps the most hideous caricature that jaundiced malice ever suggested, or that ever came from the pallet of interested prejudice--the picture of the public mind and internal state of this country. When a man represents things otherwise than as they are, I must suppose that he paints according to his wishes; I have therefore to congratulate M. Dumouriez upon having found an opportunity of discharging such a mass of moral bile.

* The savings to Great Britain and Ireland from this measure, are estimated at near £. 3,000,000; the loss to the enemy will be of course the same, exclusive of the piracies committed on the Ships of Americans, and other neutral Powers, who it may be expected, will put themselves under the protection of our Convoys.

The opposition, the spirit of revolution, the discontents of large bodies of manufacturers thrown out of bread and employment, the decay of our commerce, the mistrust which stoppages of payment and bankruptcies must occasion in mercantile transactions, the embarrassments of the Bank, the activity of the French in fomenting discord in the three kingdoms, the necessity of maintaining a great army to protect our shores against insult, and the immensity of the expence attending it, the danger of keeping the whole nation under arms amidst the prevalence of universal disaffection and desire of innovation, are very properly classed together; these are the real calamities which he declares are alone sufficient to exhaust the resources and courage of the nation.

That opposition, which so long served as a shield to those doctrines which alone could have cankered the heart and consumed the vitals of this country, and has been the effective ally of the evil principle in this conflict, is now driven from its place by the burst of public opinion, divided in itself it can scarcely be considered as having any political existence, and, whatever be the event of the foreign contest, is sunk itself into nullity. Their other auxiliaries, arising out of the decay of our commerce and manufactures, are not likely to be much more serviceable to the French than those, whom they consider as their friends in the House of Commons, or those who are their real friends out of it. Of the latter, the number

ber is not considerable, notwithstanding the industry that has been used to increase them. The Bank was never more flourishing nor its credit more substantial; the predictions of mischief to result from the stoppage of payment in specie has been proved to be false; and it is now evident, that if the measure was wise and beneficial at the moment, it was equally so prospectively. We know that if the threats of an invasion should be executed, no inconvenience would now arise from it to the Bank, an advantage which we presume will endure as long as the struggle; its paper has never been depreciated in the smallest degree, though every expedient was used to effect it; and it is now understood to be substantially richer than in any former period. Bullion also is flowing into the country beyond all former example, the natural consequence of our flourishing commerce and manufactures.—Another hope however still remains to our inveterate enemies, if the expectations already stated should fail them. We are to be exhausted, and at length utterly destroyed by the enormous expenditure in our defence against the menaced invasion. The charges for our navy are high, and we have a large army to pay; but with respect to the ruin to be brought on us by arming the nation, M. Dumouriez will find himself greatly deceived; the people (and to whom does this forebode danger?) are every where flocking to the standard of their Sovereign and the constitution in a manner unexampled

amplified in any country; a * very large proportion of them without any pay, or allowance whatever, and others at a very trifling cost to the public. It is admitted however that our expence on the whole is unavoidably great; but, let it be remembered, our resources are also great. Does M. Dumouriez see in the voluntary contributions for the defence of the state (so considerable notwithstanding the accumulation of the assessed taxes) the indubitable symptoms of a diseased public mind? Will he take the terms upon which the loan † has been raised, more favourable than those of the preceding year, as the test of that panic which must mark every money transaction by the exorbitancy of its conditions, when means and credit are worn out? Is our courage no more, because the nation rises in arms with one electric impulse to crush the invading, and, as he wishes us to believe, invincible foe?

So much for M. Dumouriez's colouring! Would it have been possible to guess for whom the picture was meant, had he not

* In the town of Liverpool alone, 4,000 men are enrolled, to serve at their own expence in all respects; 2,800 of these are already under arms.

† It is well known in the city that immense payments are already made in advance on the loan; which was of £.17,000,000, and was negotiated at nearly the actual price of the stocks, and without the funds having been affected by it, to the extent of 11. per cent. The prices of the funds were higher when the loan was settled, than they were before the invasion was denounced by the Directory last Winter.

taken the precaution of writing the name of England at the bottom of it?

Under these circumstances of the country, it is needless to remark in how different a point of view whatever he advances as to the Invasion bears, except such considerations as are purely military. In viewing his two plans for effecting a descent, we should not gain credit for much sincerity, if we combatted the difficulties which he represents as amounting to almost a physical impossibility of transporting a large Army across the Channel; or for much prudence, if we contested his opinion on the practicability of invading us in smaller bodies. We may, however, say with respect to the latter, that the two examples which he alleges by no means prove the facility of it. When Hoche's expedition failed from Brest, the Admiral who commanded our Fleet, acting under the impression at that time general here, turned his attention entirely to Portugal; a natural mistake, but one which can never again recur in this War. The assertion that Ireland was lost to us, had the 8 or 9000 men composing Hoche's Army been landed there, when at that moment they would not have found a friend in the South of Ireland, and would have had their retreat infallibly cut off, is worthy of any of the Republican Journalists who are not sent to Cayenne. There is no doubt but that such a Squadron as that which transported the legion of banditti to Wales, and was composed of two frigates

frigates and two corvettes, may easily escape observation; but the built which gives them swiftness prevents their transporting any number of men, and they had only in fact 1150 soldiers on board; they were too few to attract our attention, or create delay to each other; the troops were landed with nothing but their firelocks and a few bags of biscuit; and besides, after the failure of Hoche's expedition it was impossible for us to suspect or be on our guard against the attempt, especially as it was such a one as to this moment M. Dumouriez is himself unequal to guess the motives for it. It is right to say thus much, because if before the arrival of the French in Bantry Bay we indulged in an over-weaning confidence in the security our Fleets afforded us, we now seem to have gone too far into the contrary extreme, though of the two it is doubtless the safest and the most salutary.

With respect to the obstacles which he opposes to the possibility of our Cruisers maintaining their stations in the Channel, there is no doubt but that they may be accidentally blown from off a Port; but his tides * that run without exception, whether ebbing or flowing, at the rate of three leagues an hour, his nearly invariably constant and

* Their averaged course is less than three knots an hour; but M. Dumouriez when at Cherbourg probably heard of the race of Alderney, and taking *partem pro toto*, as his countrymen are rather apt to do, assigned its extreme velocity to all the tides of the channel.

periodical † Easterly or Westerly winds, and the extreme difficulty of keeping to windward and of resisting this imaginary current, cannot but excite the smile of a British seaman; nor can he view with much more gravity the other causes which are alleged as indispensably compelling him to put frequently into port.‡ In the year 1759, the port of Brest was so closely blocked up for six months, that not a boat could pass in or out of it. In the course of the last year, Earl St. Vincent's fleet remained between seven and eight months before Cadiz, without once quitting its station. The Channel fleet was off Brest nearly the whole of the summer; and our North Sea fleet, after having blockaded the Texel for twenty-two weeks, when it returned into Port for water, provisions, and to refit, completed those operations *in three days*, which even the Dutch (who are so much superior to the French in nautical matters) conceived could not be done in less than *three weeks*. In fact (except any epidemical complaint should chance to exist) our cruizers always return into Port with their men in better health and spirits than the excesses, into which they unavoidably fall when in Port, allow them to put to sea with. But under

† What meteorological journal, or what weathercock did the ingenious Frenchman consult?

‡ M. Dumouriez seems here to have made great use of the *Voyage de Paris à St. Cloud par Mer*. The fact is, that the French could never keep their seamen out on a cruize for any length of time, and he imagined we found the same difficulty.

what justification can M. Dumouriez cover himself for having made a positive statement respecting the squadrons commanded by Johnstone and Carteret in the Channel in the last war, when no such squadrons ever existed; nor indeed can any facts, of the nature of those so circumstantially announced, be traced out.

I will not cavil at his assertions of the practicability of effecting a *partial* descent; but it is whimsical to see in what manner, when he has once convinced himself of it, he presses into his service whatever may facilitate it. All the vessels he makes use of from Brest to East Frieland, whether doggers, schuyts, chassèmarées, or of whatever construction (and they are infinite) are without an exception “admirable sailors; all take the ground equally well;” their crews, whether French, Flemish, or Dutch, are “daring and enterprising.” Again, “*Pars pro toto*,” what is partially true, (it can be asserted from positive experience, and indeed it is notorious) is to a much greater extent unfounded. And how is it possible that the masters of all of them should be “perfectly well acquainted with our coasts?” they are not concerned in our coasting, not even in our smuggling trade. Some of their fishermen perhaps have a partial knowledge of it, as the Dutch of the Mouth of the Thames, and the French of some parts of our South-West coast. But let us smooth these difficulties for him, and even let him land his
his

his men, and all the articles with which he states they must be encumbered, uninterruptedly, and in as short a space of time as that to which he confines them, and without insisting upon the embarrassment which must arise from the surf occasioned by a wind sufficiently full upon our coast to carry over, to the exact point aimed at, his heterogeneous flotilla, many of the vessels of which cannot be supposed to be weatherly. However ill supported many of his arguments are, there are certainly others by which it might be shewn that the project of throwing 10 or 15,000 men upon our shores is perfectly practicable. But how will he victual them when there? We have too large an extent of coast for it to be possible for our cruisers, whilst we are uncertain of what spot the Enemy will attack, to protect with certainty every part of it; but, his disembarkation, once effected, leaves no doubt about the point to be watched: and though M. Dumouriez supposes a part of his invading flotilla to return back to port as safely as it came, and, without waiting for a change of wind or of tide, again sends it off laden with provisions for the French camp, and makes the vessels pass and repass with as much regularity and ease as he would draw diagonals from the opposite angles of a parallelogram, there is no seafaring man who would not consign to instant famine the devoted army, whose dependence for provisions, whilst we are masters of the sea,

should rest on so infinitely precarious a supply. The measures concerted all along the coast deprive them of any possibility of resource from the country in which they land.

M. Dumouriez then assumes that the Invaders would have perfect leisure to entrench themselves, but his grounds for so doing are not particularized. There are very many points of the coast upon which 10,000 men could be brought to act, before the Enemy could fortify himself upon them; but there are none on which a certain force, sufficient to molest him, and to impede his throwing up works, could not be almost instantaneously collected; and if it is our policy, it is evidently no less our inclination, to adopt that plan of resistance.

But let us suppose their intrenchments completed, and that we are compelled to besiege them in form. There is little similarity in the circumstances, under which we should act in such a case, and those under which the Austrians attacked the works thrown up at Fort Kehl, the instance cited by M. Dumouriez. They were then, though finally victorious, exhausted and worn out with such fatigues and vicissitudes of a long and bloody campaign, as have seldom been paralleled, while the garrison not only received punctually every thing requisite from its comrades who occupied the other side of the Rhine in and about Strasburgh, but was itself relieved as regularly as a picket would have

have been. M. Dumouriez says not how long those works were constructing; six weeks was the time, according to the best information I can obtain, and during which they suffered no interruption. The other points of advantage, which he assigns to the Imperialists, will best be considered together with his allegations in the next paragraph.

These allegations are the woeful list of our military deficiencies: "We are unequal to the toils and delays of such a siege, and have neither generals, engineers, nor a battering train." How was the strong and well-fortified town of Bastia taken? By a detachment of British seamen and marines, or soldiers acting as such, inferior in number to the garrison of regularly-disciplined troops, and who had no tents but such as were made of sails, and no other battering train than the lower deck guns of line of battle ships. As to the merits of generals, a scope may be properly left for opinion; but it would have been more becoming in him, who lost the decisive battle of Nerwinden, to have spoken in a less affirmative tone of those, who have sustained with honour the reputation of the British arms on the continent of Europe, in America, and in the East and West Indies, and have often led our troops to victory; and whatever M. Dumouriez may think, or chuse to appear to think, we see with cheerful confidence the direction of our armies committed to their hands.

How

How is it possible to avoid giving a flat contradiction to his assertion respecting our engineers, or rather respecting their non-existence, whilst it is notorious that their corps, coupled with the artillery, is the best constituted and instructed of any in our service, and is at least equal to any in Europe. The fortifications of Gibraltar, which baffled the combined efforts of France and Spain, were traced out by their hands; and it will shake another of his dogmas, if he contests the ability with which the batteries were constructed at St. Marcou,* where some thousands of his invincible countrymen were repulsed with slaughter by a handful of troops, composed of marines, invalids, seamen, and artillery, in all about 200. How M. Dumouriez can announce that one of the finest, if not the first establishment of ordnance in Europe is destitute "of a battering train," we know not. Even were he in the right, we have shewn that our heavy ships' guns are no inadequate substitutes for it; and he will allow that we have enough of those, should there not be at Woolwich an adequate number of howitzers, which otherwise our ignorant engineers might prefer for the pur-

* For the particulars of this attack, vide Gazette, May 12th, 1798. It had required two months preparations. All the fishermen on the coast had been pressed, and the four frigates at Havre dismantled to man the gunboats, which composed the whole strength applicable to such an expedition from Chereburg to Havre. We may accept this omen of the result of the grand expedition as reasonably, as we do it triumphantly.

pose of rendering the enemy's camp untenable.

However, let us suppose three or four bodies, each of between 10 and 11,000 men, to be so entrenched upon our coast, as to oblige us to bring down battering cannon against them: it is notorious that we have now actually on foot a regularly-disciplined force sufficient to enable us, besides keeping a large army in the field for any emergency which might arise, to surround each of these detachments with superior numbers, and such a cloud of cavalry as to prevent the possibility of their stirring out of their intrenchments. Their communication by sea would be cut off; and we could bring against them, in the course of a few days, a hundred, or whatever number we chose, of 32-pounders, from our arsenals or from our men of war, which would beat their earthen redoubts to powder. Besides, what cover, or bomb-proofs would they have to protect them from shells? Reasoning by analogy from facts which have taken place, how long can it be imagined that the period of resistance which we could experience on any one point could possibly last? and what then is there in M. Dumouriez's projected operations, even were his sketch of the internal state, and feelings of the nation as correct a picture, as I have endeavoured already to shew it to be a gross and total and, I think, voluntary, misrepresentation, to justify a tittle of the terrifying deductions, with which he threatens us.

He

He then exclaims, " What * effect upon France will the loss of 10,000 men produce?" A trifling one certainly as to mere numbers, and as to sentiment, and feeling and humanity; but a most powerful one of intimidation upon those who are to follow them, when they learn, that not a man of their comrades, who put foot upon English ground, had escaped captivity or death.

The conclusions of M. Dumouriez are,

1st. That if 60 or 80,000 French overcoming the obstacles to a grand disembarkation, effect a landing (divided and disaffected, as a great part of the nation is) they are in sufficient strength to conquer and revolutionize Great Britain.

2dly. That several partial descents will have nearly the same effect, and render a grand attack more practicable.

3dly. That the threat alone of invasion, if persevered in, will destroy us.

4thly. That nothing can put an end to this menace, but a general war or a general peace, which can result from the event of the Congress at Rastadt alone.

Let M. Dumouriez answer for his own consistency. In his chapter upon France, he pronounces the English nation to be as " high-minded, as energetic, and as animated, both by patriotism and national hatred as his own countrymen," and descants upon the

* Why has the capture of the *Hercule*, and the circumstances of it been so carefully concealed in France?

easy possibility of our land forces alone effecting the total and irreparable failure of the grand expedition ; and in the next page he states, that any considerable delay, or the final dereliction of the project, would suffice to rouse the French army to vengeance, and the subversion of their own government.

We may add,

1st. That where the invading enemy will be harrassed from the instant of his disembarkation, will find the whole of the country laid waste up to the spot on which our armies will be collected to receive him, that those armies greatly superior in numbers, highly disciplined *, possessing all the advantages attending the carrying on of war at home, and animated by every motive which can exalt the human mind, are supported by the whole nation in arms, nothing but shame and defeat can be the lot of the invader.

2dly. That from the considerations already offered, the plan of partial descents is not more calculated, than the preceding one, to answer the ends of the French in their grand attempt.

3dly. That the French Rulers, whose armies have long subsisted entirely upon the plunder of Foreign Nations, must be unable to maintain them at home for any considerable

* Under what circumstances did M. Dumouriez drive the Austrians and Prussians out of Champagne?

time; and that, were it possible, they are apprised by M. Dumouriez himself, that it could not be done with impunity to their own Government.

4thly. That the menace of Invasion cannot very much longer survive the delay of its execution, and if not executed, cannot expire without disgrace and punishment to those who shall have made it an instrument to delude and extort its last resources from their own nation, without a real intention of bringing it to the trial. That as our safety depends upon the failure or the relinquishment of the invasion; and that as to the one, or the other of those events, through our own strength, or the inadequacy of the enemy's means, we can, under the blessing of Providence, thus confidently look forward as at no very distant period, no nation is so exempt from the influence of the event of the deliberations at Rastadt as *This*, which appears to be the only one either willing or able to save itself. Nearly the whole of the evils, which could arise from the pacific result of that Congress, assembled to regulate and ratify *preconcerted projects of indemnification and plunder*, have been already felt by us; and the advantages which would accrue from the rupture of it would be extensive and immense. In the one event we have little to lose, and in the other much to gain.

I trust

I trust it will not be imputed to those Strictures, in which I have endeavoured to confine myself closely to the text of M. Dumouriez, that by shewing the difficulties attending a descent, they tend to relax that energetic spirit which pervades the Nation; for no one can be more deeply convinced, that it is the existence of, and the perseverance in that spirit, which can alone render those difficulties insurmountable. I should regret too, if I could be reproached with having permitted myself too much asperity with regard to the Author of a very able, and, for the most part, a very useful Work; but where his candour and impartiality have deserted him, it was surely a just object, if not a duty, for an Englishman to strive to rescue the National Character from degradation, and to endeavour to obviate the effect of wilfull misrepresentations, which he must have intended to intimidate and enfeeble the country in the hour of its danger, by depreciating our credit and our resources, and diminishing and depressing our public spirit, and our means of resistance.

FINIS.

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A
SPECULATIVE SKETCH
OF
EUROPE.

CHAP. I.

A U S T R I A.

BEFORE the French Revolution Austria was the first power in Europe, not only on account of her hereditary dignity as head of the German Empire, but of the strength of her armies, the extent and position of her territories, and her influence in the political affairs of Europe. Her alliance with France afforded her a security against the necessity of war with every nation towards whom she was unwilling to be herself the aggressor.

She might even have avoided the unfortunate war in which she has been engaged with France. In fact her influence in that country would not have been so powerful over a mixed government as with an unlimited monarchy. Her connection as existing between the two nations would not have been so close as that between two allied cabinets; but if she lost the sovereignty she had assumed over a weak government, she was at least certain to find more stability, less caprice and less intrigue among a whole people than in the ave-

nues of a throne, the succession of princes or the changes of administration.

By the present war Austria has lost her ancient hereditary dominions in the Netherlands, which afforded her the most intimate and advantageous connections with England, France and Holland. She has lost the fertile plains of Lombardy, from which, however, she never derived all the advantages they offered. She has lost her influence in Italy, where a branch of her house vegetates, as it were, in a precarious soil at the head of a petty state, that must soon be absorbed by the democratic revolution: that revolution, whose strides in Italy are too rapid to be resisted, and which, before the end of the present century, will unite all her states federally, though perhaps not indivisibly, in one single body politic.

She has lost all communication with the Rhine, by ceding that part of Austria which approaches it, to the Duke of Modena, with the hope indeed of recovering its possession by hereditary descent, unless the policy of France should have forestalled her by providing obstacles to such an event.

In fine, she will lose by the dismemberment of Germany, and by the consequent dissolution of her political association, the solid though ideal influence attached to the head of the empire.

And what are her compensations? She has gained in the course of the war a part of Poland, whose territorial extent would more than double the Netherlands, and whose population equals a third of their inhabitants.

She has gained, as an indemnity for Lombardy, all the Venetian territory on *Terra-firma*, from the Lake of Garda to Rovigo; the superb city of Venice, the Frioul, Istria, and Venetian Dalmatia;

tia; amounting to twice the extent of country she possessed in Lombardy, comprising twice as many ports and twice the commercial and naval advantages she ever possessed.

By the concentrated position she gives her troops in their retreat from the Rhine, it seems probable she will soon possess herself of the Archbishopric of Saltsburg, of the banks of the Inn and of the Danube, from Donawerth, Ingolstadt and Passau to Vienna; and this concentric form of territory adds force and cohesion to her hereditary states. The peace of Rastadt, should it take place, will declare the fate of the Duchy of Neuburg, the Upper Palatinate and the rest of Bavaria.

It appears that, honour excepted, Austria has gained much by the war. Her dominions, even her population, is considerably augmented. Her strength and power are more centered. Her new possessions in Italy cover Hungary and Croatia, and open a most advantageous market, destined to give life to those rich provinces hitherto languishing for the means of commerce. She has now fewer objects of ambition and policy, of distant wars and ruinous expences. She has more resources to procure, by the channels of commerce and agriculture, that specie of which her isolated and literally *Mediterranean* position made her hitherto feel the want.

Less attached to the imperial dignity by the dissolution of a body politic which constituted the glory of that august title while it encumbered it with perplexities, she can in future view the rest of Germany but as an intermediate country separating her from the French republic, with whom having no longer any point of contact, it

should seem she has no longer any grounds of contest.

If she remain at peace with France, Austria seems no longer to want the aid of alliances.

Her natural enemies are, to the south-east, Turkey, a country too feeble and too ill governed to controul her; to the east and north-east, Russia, by means of her Polish possessions; to the north and west, Prussia, by means of similar acquisitions, by Silesia and even by the Upper Danube. This will happen should the houses of Saxony and the Palatinate ever form a league with Prussia, as they naturally must, the one to recover her allodial, the other her hereditary domains.

Her greatest danger, however, is on the side of Italy. By her Venetian acquisitions, which constitute her principal force, and should procure her the most important future resources, she may, before that happy period arrives, be exhausted and ruined. The Venetians, full of their ancient zeal for the aristocratic government, hurried on by their indignation at the outrages of the French and the vehemence of Cisalpine democracy, must in the first instance regard the Austrians as their liberators. This sentiment, however, cannot last. That people will for ever remember that, for a thousand years they have existed as a republic. To them even the mildest yoke will be insupportable. The nobles themselves will prefer existing as members of a free nation, to being vassals of a German sovereign. The pride of the Court will be as incorrigible at Vienna as the love of liberty in the Venetians. The vicinity of the Cisalpine Republic, that constant source of conspiracies, that sure asylum for malecontents and factionaries, will electrify the most timid. The respect for
Kings

Kings is sinking, the respect for the people is rising. The time will arrive when the Venetians will again be a free people.

Such is the irresistible progress of human nature, of public opinion, and of that revolutionary spirit which has spread over Europe. Its force and rapidity are ensured by the great superiority of free nations over monarchic governments; demonstrated by this astonishing war, and by the peace that will be its result.

The danger to the house of Austria is, alas! too real. Her possessions in Italy are precarious, and will become a source of important wars.— Either Austria will destroy the Cisalpine Republic and take advantage of the revolutions of Italy to usurp the greatest part of it, or Venice will be united, either indivisibly or federally, with the Italian Republic. And then the revolutionary spirit will spread through Dalmatia and Istria into Croatia and Hungary.

It would, however, by no means accord with the interests of France to foment the insurrection of the Venetians against the house of Austria, after having delivered that people into her hands. Neither would it be good policy for the French to favour the rapid increase of the Cisalpine Republic, or the accession of the rest of Italy to join her revolution. But every democratic government is impetuous, imprudent, destitute of method; hurried on by present circumstances, and urged by men of ephemeral power. And although the French Directory may not desire the aggrandisement of her offspring, the Cisalpines, still less will they be disposed to see the power of Austria increased by their destruction,

The French will necessarily act the part of the Romans in the quarrels of Antiochus with the Greek republics. As umpires they will be too powerful not to impose in the end a severe and inexorable law.

Events already preparing in other parts will connect themselves with the disputes of Italy. And Venice, one of the objects of the present war, will either emancipate herself from Austria, or the Emperor will be the conqueror of Italy. But it is much to be feared the Court of Vienna will ultimately there be punished where she has been most to blame.

The chapters on Switzerland and Turkey will display a connection of dangerous circumstances that will contribute, as it were, to besiege the house of Austria even in her remote *arrondissement*, where she seems to have circumscribed herself by her peace with France in order to be secure from her revolutionary contact.

CHAP. II.

P R U S S I A.

THE conduct of the French Directory in the month of January 1798, unveils another of the mysteries that conceal her secret and antecedent arrangements, whose developement will be completed (should it take place) by the peace of Rastadt. The negociations of France with Prussia are unknown : but it must have been with the consent of that power that the French have lately (on the 17th January) incorporated the Duchy of Cleves and the County of Mœurs with the Great Republic.

It is more than probable the King of Prussia had also been previously apprised of the first peremptory condition delivered at the Congress of Rastadt to the Plenipotentiary of the Emperor by those of France, and which were refused by him and the other members of the Germanic Body. This condition, which is to serve as a basis to the negotiations, comprises the cession of all the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic. That demand was both preceded and followed up by steps of severity and rigour. The French troops on the 26th January carried the Tête-de-pont of Manheim sword in hand, and threaten to take possession of the city itself, though situated on the right bank, in the same manner as they occupy the fortress of Kehl, Weteravia and Dusseldorf; and doubtless they will soon, in like manner, seize Ehrenbreitstein by force, if it is not voluntarily given up.

The

The French Directory not only cease to conceal their intention of taking the Rhine for their boundary, but they dictate to the Germanic Body assembled at Rastadt the very conditions of that cession. They will send them the plan of partition, which, by the extinction of the Ecclesiastical Sovereignities and Imperial Cities, will afford indemnities to the princes whose dominions were on the left bank of the Rhine, and thus entirely change the face of Germany.

We need not here consider with what severity France exercises the right of superior strength; or how Germany is disgraced by submitting to so rigorous a law. The Germanic Body is an aggregate of great and small states, having no common interests, no common bond of union. In Germany, there are Austrians, Prussians, Hessians, Saxons, Bavarians, &c. &c. but no German nation, and therefore no national honour.

Here then are the disadvantages of a nation of federalists. The Dutch, the Swiss, and the Italians, have suffered the very same inconveniences; and have been unable to resist a mass of twenty-five millions of men, united in a single republic, one and indivisible. The French and English are the only nations of Europe that can be actuated by rational patriotism.

But to return to Prussia. It is highly probable, that besides the estates she loses to the left of the Rhine, she will also be obliged to cede Wezel to the French. For that nation cannot be supposed to leave, in the possession of so powerful a sovereign, a fortified city, which, in time of war, would intercept the navigation of the Rhine, and become a threatening military post against Holland and the Netherlands.

The

The indemnities of this sovereign must necessarily be equivalent to what he cedes, and proportioned to his power and his complaisance to the Directory. The City of Neurenburg, together with a few scraps taken from the Bishopric of Aechstadt, from the Teutonic order, and from some miserable Imperial Cities, on which the Court of Berlin has for some years past made various attempts, though frustrated by that of Vienna, would be too inconsiderable a compensation.

The true policy of France which her plan of negociation proves her to understand, is to remove from within her limits the two principal powers of Germany; and on the other hand, to bring them closer to each other, in order that their mutual jealousy continually keeping them in arms, they may become mutually weakened: That thus they may no longer be injurious to France, whether she adopt a pacific, or pursue her system of conquest: A system congenial to the petulance of a democratic government, ever agitated by faction, ever unequal to her expenditure, whose very existence demands a constant warfare.

As no other part of Germany offers so suitable an indemnity to the King of Prussia, as the North, we may presume it will be found in the circles of Lower Saxony and Westphalia, which present several Free Cities and Ecclesiastical Sovereignities, besides the Electorate of Hanover. This domain the French declare they shall most certainly take from the King of Great Britain: a step, however, which it is by no means prudent to permit.

In fact, the North of Germany appears to be secured from infraction by a treaty of neutrality, as yet respected, and by the declarations of the

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King of Prussia. The fate of that part of Germany depends entirely on the character of the young Monarch who at so critical a moment is undergoing the severest trial.

Whatever be the result of the internal combat between principle and policy in that Prince's breast, he will immediately be forced by the incorporation of his domains on the left bank of the Rhine with the French Republic, categorically to declare for or against the integrity of the empire. He will either be the saviour or the destroyer of the Germanic Constitution. We may even believe, that this imperfect constitution excites no interest in the great powers it combines, since it is favorable but to the smaller members of the association.

Does good policy permit then its destruction, in compliance with the magisterial plan and proposal of a conquering nation, that spreads every where around her the seeds of democracy and disorganization? Is not this feudal association the very Ægis of Royalty? Will not this partition, the result of superior force, this involuntary change of sovereigns, irritate the people, thus ceded, exchanged, and sold like herds of cattle? The revolutionary spirit, the promulgation of the Rights of Man, the love of equality, will they not produce a dangerous commotion in the midst of this topographical revolution on which the people themselves have never been consulted? Do we not already behold this perturbation, so natural to arise, spreading through the domains of Baden, of Darmstadt, and of the Black Forest? And will not the example of the sudden revolution of Switzerland hasten the progress of this conflagration?

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Can the King of Prussia flatter himself, that he has the certain means to prevent the propagation of the same spirit in his own dominions? Ought he not to dread the spread of democracy still more than he desires the augmentation of his territory? Does he not perceive that the fall of the Germanic Body is the result of a mortal combat between democracy and feudality, and that this barrier destroyed, he is but a step from the very extinction of Monarchy? Does he not foresee that triumphant democracy espoused by an impetuous nation which periodically consecrates (by its anniversary of a national stain) the horrid oath of hatred to kings will take advantage of the disturbances excited by the iniquitous partition of Germany to annihilate Royalty itself, and establish in every country a representative and municipal government?

But should the King of Prussia refuse his assent to the first article, proposed by the French negociators at Rastadt, of ceding the whole left bank of the Rhine to France, which she has preliminarily incorporated and municipalised; that article which involves the partition of Germany and the destruction of its constitution; he will be forced to renew the war with France. Of this who can entertain a doubt? Who can doubt that the King of Prussia is placed in a most dangerous dilemma? It is for him to consult his strength, his courage, and his principles; and the fate of Europe depends on his decision.

We cannot reason on the supposition of his refusal, and of the war which would be its consequence, because at present such an event appears by no means probable. Let us suppose then that yielding to circumstances and to necessity, he

should consent to the dismemberment of Germany, and to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France. In that case he will be amply compensated. His domain increased by one third of Poland, and rounded towards Germany, will be more concentrated in appearance; will possess more real strength.

He will continue the protector of the North of Germany, at least as far as the Weser. He will have great interests, and an important influence in the heart of Germany, by the increase and the rounding of his domain of Anspach: provided however he should not exchange them for some other territory in order to form an indemnity for the house of Deux-ponts or of Orange.

It is probable he will have few points of contact with the French Republic, and consequently few common objects to contest.

His natural enemies will be Russia, on account of Poland; but principally Austria. The enmity of Prussia and Austria will ever be implacable both between the nations and their courts. It is founded alas! on mutual injuries, on ancient wars, on national jealousies, and on reciprocal defections, whenever policy has allied them against a common enemy. Their provocations are heavy, their resentments deep. The French have taken advantage of them, and will take advantage of them again.

But the King of Prussia's most dangerous enemy, whose progress will be still more rapid in peace than in war itself; who is ever active, and knows no repose, is Democracy. To this enemy neither treasures nor armies are a barrier. He exhausts the one, he seduces the other; he surrounds and penetrates in every direction the Prussian domains. He at once besieges and undermines

dermines the throne. And that Prince must inevitably be buried under its ruins, unless he fly to his tent and change the character of sovereign for that of warrior. He alone can restore to degraded Germany her courage. He alone can restore to Royalty its respect and its dignity; by showing himself a *Hero-King*.

Should he without loss of time decide on this line of conduct, he may yet be the saviour of Switzerland, of Swabia, and of Franconia, from the democratic perturbation already introduced there. He will rally around him, Russia, the other Northern Powers, the whole of Germany, and even the House of Austria: who has only abandoned the common cause when she was exhausted, and was herself basely forsaken by her allies. He will save England:—Yes, he will save Europe. He will save the laws, the public morals, the royal dignity, and himself. Should he decide otherwise, he will himself be one of the first victims to the democratic revolution. He will himself have forged the instruments of his own destruction.

The safety of Prussia and of her Monarch exists but in a general war with France; or, in a universal peace, which should stipulate and fix the interest of the fifteen Powers, hastily sketched in this political picture. That peace can only be the effect of the most serious preparations for general war, and (if the threat be insufficient), must be preceded by the reality. Already has a false prudence given time to complete the revolution of Switzerland. Already the torrent of democracy is there preparing to inundate and overwhelm the German Empire.

CHAP. III.

THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

THIS body politic cannot be better described than in the commencement of the *Ars poetica* of Horace. An incoherent system of jurisprudence as voluminous as its sovereignties are numerous, supported this Gothic edifice whose architecture would scarcely bear a single glance from the eye of reason. Its antiquity, the inactivity of the neighbouring nations, the weakness and inertness of its various states, the counterbalance established by the House of Brandenburg, to prevent Austria from acquiring universal plunder, or in order to share with her the spoil, the even contest between two Christian sects, that almost equally divide the Empire, secured the existence of the Germanic Constitution, whose various sovereigns were ranged around the standards of Austria and of Russia. Political wars agitated this country from time to time for the interests of particular courts or families. But the interests of their subjects had no share either in these wars, or the treaties in which they terminated.

So little of public spirit or of patriotism dwelt in this shapeless mass, that when a foreign power was at war with the Empire, it was within that Empire itself it found the most active allies, the most numerous auxiliaries. Germany is a nursery of soldiers. The two great sovereigns at the head of the Germanic body maintain armies disproportioned to the population of their dominions and to their treasures. The petty princes
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tell themselves, or their subjects, either to these two great potentates, or to foreign states. But no sooner is it requisite to unite a nation, the most warlike in Europe, in defence of their country and constitution, than it is found impossible to give consistency to this body, thus divided by opposing interests, and by the mutual hatred and jealousies of its inhabitants.

The French Revolution has unveiled the secret cause of weakness in the Germanic body. Its members are ill combined. They have ill concerted their operations, and no sooner has their individual interest, well or ill understood, been found at variance with that of the body at large, than they have mutually forsaken each other. The French armies have usurped the whole left bank of the Rhine, have carried ruin and devastation into the very heart of the Empire, and have left behind them shame to its sovereigns, and a revolutionary spirit among their subjects.

All Germany has now laid down her arms and humbly sues for peace. A congress which will cover the Germanic body with eternal shame, while it seals its destruction, is assembled at Rastadt. The German armies, in consequence of a suspension of arms, are withdrawn more than thirty leagues from the Rhine, while the French occupy Weteravia, freely traverse Westphalia, and lay under contribution the countries rendered neutral by an armistice to which they do not conform; while surrounding this unfortunate congress, they have possessed themselves of Mentz, of Manheim, and the bishopric of Basil, and threaten still greater outrages, if the plenipotentiaries of the Empire occupied more than a month with mutual disputes of form, do not immediately accept as the basis

of negotiation the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France: A condition which, under the title of indemnities, involves the partition of the sovereignties of the Empire.

The world has thought this plan of indemnity may be easily executed, by suppressing the ecclesiastical sovereignties, and dividing their domains among those secular princes, who are to receive compensations. This is the last blow aimed at the Catholic religion; and it is levelled by the House of Austria herself!—Yes. As the government of the earth is not of divine right this theocracy must naturally be annihilated at the close of a philosophic age! that has extended its daring views to still greater excesses. But tis a singular fact, that as a remedy for the losses caused by the French revolution, they imitate the example it has given of stripping the clergy of their possessions.

The free, Imperial, and Hanseatic towns, are a second class of members of the Empire. Their existence, to the number of fifty-one, in the centre of this feudal cahos, is almost miraculous. Nothing does more honour to the German character than the tranquillity they have enjoyed amid the wars of ambition that have so often desolated Germany. It is amazing that neither feudality should have subjugated these petty republics, nor any one of these raised itself on the ruins of the feudal system. It was reserved till this æra of metaphysics, at the same moment to preach the rights of man, and to destroy these institutions, founded on liberty and the most sacred right of property. But their cause will be espoused by none, for they consist but of the people!

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These will probably be the second victims to the system of partition. Each of them will be lost in the possessions of one of the great powers who are to receive such indemnities as convenience shall appropriate to them. It is easy to foresee however, that cities driven to despair by the loss of their liberty, will be no very valuable acquisition. The greatest and richest of them will be the most difficult to subjugate. They will not only preserve but propagate that genius of liberty and independence, of which the revolutionary spirit will take advantage to overturn every throne.

But let us quit the Germanic constitution, her ecclesiastical states, and her free cities, which, if the peace of Rastadt takes place, it will annihilate. The title of Emperor will then become an empty name, and even fall into disuse. Germany will be divided between seven sovereigns : Austria, Prussia, Hesse, Saxony, the Palatine, Wurtemberg, and Brunswick. Each of these seven planets will be surrounded by satellites destined at length to become food for the masses that will absorb them.

Each of these seven sovereigns will be somewhat more powerful than before. But as objects of dispute will be more numerous, as there will no longer be a centre of union ; as the diet of the Empire, (that tribunal of Amphictyons) will exist no more, or fall into contempt ; as the general jurisprudence of Germany, violated and destroyed by the peace of Rastadt, will no longer be a barrier against individual ambition, wars will follow each other in more rapid succession, they will be excited and continued by the policy of France.

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Germany will be further than ever from forming a solid body, or the Germans an individual nation. That country will again become the theatre of ambition and political fanaticism. The princes whose domains border on the frontiers of the French Republic, will become her allies in the same manner as the kings of Pergamus and Bithynia were allied to the Romans, or as the King of Sardinia and the Batavian Republic are already allied to the French. They will employ the troops of these princes against the other Sovereigns of Germany, as they do the Spaniards and the Piedmontese against England and Austria.

This is the most favorable supposition for Germany with regard to the miserable effects of the peace proposed to be made at Rastadt. But a different result begins to assume much greater probability. The revolutionary spirit will perhaps constantly frustrate the plans marked out by the policy of France. The people of Germany will refuse to accede to a system of partition. Threatened with a change of Sovereigns without being themselves consulted, they will prefer liberty, and above all democracy, after the example of that triumphant people who so imperiously decide upon their fate. The whole mystery is discovered. National guards, municipalities, a representative government, the plunder of the clergy, the expulsion of the nobles, all founded on equality, be it real or mistaken.—With an exemplar of these before them, it requires but a few daring demagogues to revolutionize a province in an instant.

There exists at present a revolutionary *propaganda*, whose missionaries are extremely active, and more experienced than ever. It has a seminary in Italy, in Switzerland, on the long extended

ed banks of the Rhine, and in every metropolis. Peace will open new fields for its activity, and secure it fortresses in the very heart of Germany. In the North, Hamburg—Frankfort, and Augsburg, in the South, will be its revolutionary schools, whence swarms of missionaries will spread with rapidity around the sovereigns of Germany. And these sovereigns who have, with equal pusillanimity and injustice, been the destroyers of their own constitution (important even in its weakness), will then be easily destroyed by their own subjects in their turn. The proclamation of the Ambassador Mengaud to the Swiss, declares that the French will engage immediately to support all those nations who shall demand their assistance to establish democratic liberty. What will then be the state of Germany? We see already what begins to be that of Italy.

What remedy can be opposed to the evils that threaten Austria? The shameful conferences of Rastadt broken off, a national war, union, and a *Hero-king* who will revive the German Eagle with no other ambition than to be the saviour of his country—or a universal peace throughout Europe, preventing or terminating that general war.

CHAP. IV.

S W I T Z E R L A N D.

SWITZERLAND is the bulwark and the key of Germany. Her federal system the difference between her various governments, the smallness of her component states, neutralized as it were the strength of this warlike nation. Having lost by the revolutions of France, of Holland, of Venice, and of Genoa, a lucrative market for 30,000 of her warriors, she now finds a superabundance of her youth at home that endangers her existence.

As long as the French government left the Swiss at peace, they did not feel that burden, because the expenditure of the emigrants, and the supply of the armies, have spread a mass of specie over the country, and have turned all their natural activity towards the channels of mercantile operations and commercial profit. Every thing is now changed. The revolutionary propaganda has now been six years at work. The successes and the threats of Buonaparte have spread a panic among all governments. Aristocracy is trembling, democracy is in motion, and desires to shake off the depression in which it has till now with considerable injustice been retained. The world know the despotism which the government of Friburg exercised towards the inhabitants of Gruyere, that of Bern to the Pays de Vaud, those of St. Gal and Zurich to their peasantry, the Grisons to the Valteline, &c.

The French government begun by wresting Porentruy from the Bishopric of Basil. The

Swiss made no resistance. From that æra the fall of the government of Bern was predicted.

After this the French revolutionized Geneva, and made it a kind of Fauxbourg St. Antoine.—The Swiss preserved the same silence. Then it was prophesied that either Geneva would be the bridge by which Monarchy would re-enter France or Anarchy spread itself over Switzerland.

The Valteline then rose against its boorish governors; and Switzerland preserved the same silence.

At length the French government, seeing Germany at their feet, judges that the fruit is ripe: and therefore, despising the slow methodic steps of policy, seizes at once the rest of the Bishopric of Basil, takes under its protection and revolutionises the Pays de Vaud, and demands money of the Swiss; sowing at the same time the seeds of faction, innovation and anarchy in their principal Cantons.

Thus have they been at once outraged and menaced. What will be the result? Perhaps they will take arms to defend themselves against a democratic revolution. They will then be surrounded and attacked, Soleure and Friburg from the Bishopric of Basil, and Bern, from the Pays de Vaud; while the Gallo-Cisalpins will arrive by the Lakes of Wallenstadt and Zurich, and another colony enter the very heart of the Canton of Bern by Mount St. Gothard. It demands but a six weeks campaign, should the Swiss be left to themselves without a hope of diversion or assistance from any other power. Then will Switzerland be ruined: it will be anarchised.

Should this not be the case, the Swiss, disunited among themselves and conscious of their weakness,

ness, will obey every command the Directory may impose. Then will they strip themselves of all the specie they have amassed with more avidity than foresight during all the calamities of France. Then will aristocracy be totally banished from their governments. Then will the Pays de Vaud be free either as a petty republic, or by being united to Geneva: or it will be incorporated with France, because French is the language of the country. Perhaps the French Directory will even extend its system of incorporation as far as Friburg and Bern, and take for the limits of the Great Republic, on that side, the Kandell and the Aar. Should they even be contented with securing the Pays de Vaud, either as a distinct republic or as a French department, still France will not be thereby prevented from keeping in a state of dependence the whole of democratised Switzerland, thus become convenient for every purpose to which she would in future convert it.

By democratising and ruining Switzerland the French Directory will revive the activity and military energy of that nation. They will procure a most warlike vanguard, for their project ever uniformly pursued, of revolutionising and extinguishing every sovereignty but that of the people. Switzerland is no longer a barbarous country of impassable mountains, where a handful of men can stop the progress of a powerful army. The gigantic victories of the Swiss depended as much on the topography of their country as on the valour of their rustic heroes. The Swiss are no longer the same people: their country is no longer the same country. Their mountains are now cultivated and adorned with rich and happy villages, and, except a few intercepting glaciers, they

they have great roads like those of France, affording an easy communication between their principal towns, and laying the country open in every direction from its frontiers to its center. The heaviest artillery may now be conveyed to every part. There is not a defile or a wood from the superb road of Geneva to Schaffhausen; from thence to Zurich, or from Zurich to Constance. Thus in the first war France may be engaged in with the house of Austria, now rendered blind by the fear of present dangers to the still greater dangers of futurity, the French will set out from Switzerland (then become their military post) in lieu of setting out from the borders of the Rhine. They will enter Germany by Schaffhausen and Constance, while the Gallo-Cisalpins arrive by the Tirol and the Frioul. The former will incorporate with themselves by the way a numerous and excellent infantry of Swiss, driven from their country by misery, electrified by democracy, enemies to Kings, and lovers of novelty.

Such will doubtless be the result of the quarrel with Switzerland, since Germany, panic-struck and almost brutalized by egoism, abandons them to their fate: not foreseeing that Switzerland, in her present state, is the *Ægis* of Germany, which after a diminution of one third of her ancient extent, is menaced with revolution in all her points of contact with France. And such is doubtless the great plan of the Directory in the quarrel they have excited with Switzerland. This is not a mere conjecture or surmise. It is proved by a series of transactions and of facts, on which the eyes of all Europe are fixed, while democratic indiscretion, and particularly that of the French, leaves no doubt upon the subject.

It appears by the oath of the Helvetic confederacy renewed at the Diet of Arau on the 25th of January, that the Swiss are aware of their dangerous situation, and that they are desirous to extricate themselves, without injury to their liberty or their honour.

Basil alone has broken her alliance, and in so doing has acted unwisely. For now this little Republic no longer forms a part of any body-politic whatever, while her position on the left bank of the Rhine should warn her that, like Mulhausen, she must infallibly be incorporated in the French Republic. Geneva must expect the same fate, and the Pays de Vaud will follow.

But the Republic of Basil, while committing this error, to which it will owe its destruction, has given an excellent example to the other Cantons, by admitting to the rights of Citizens her subjects, inhabitants of the country, and by re-establishing that legal equality which is the only solid basis of every Republican Government, and even of every well constituted Monarchy. Nothing is more opposite to the very existence of a Republic than the aristocracy of several of the Cantons; than the rigorous subjection in which they hold a number of their Bailiwicks, because they were at different periods acquired by conquest; and persisting to refuse them the rights of Citizens, for which they have themselves so valiantly fought.

If the Cantons who are thus circumstanced have the wisdom to imitate, with some modification, the example of Basil, they will shut the door against the Revolutionary Demon that now disturbs their peace. They will increase their real force by adding to the number of their citizens, and by forming to themselves a constitution of more simplicity,
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and more agreeable to justice and to nature. They will inspire all their neighbours with confidence and respect, and again become the bulwark of liberty, and a barrier to ambition. They will then, by adhering firmly together, be the arbiters of Germany and the standard of the oppressed.

This reform ought not—cannot originate in the general diet. It would involve dangerous discussions and consequences. Each Canton ought to have generosity enough to adopt it *proprio motu* vigorously and sincerely. The remonstrances of the subjugated Bailiwicks are just. Their opposition to the law of superior force is natural. If the Cantons are obstinate, their subjects will find external aid, and Switzerland will be conquered by France, and distracted by a civil war. That people, hitherto the wisest nation of Europe, ought also to be the most essentially free. Their fate is in their own hands. They may chuse between anarchy and the most purely constitutional republican liberty. But they have not a moment to lose.

The danger that threatens Switzerland is most imminent. That country may most effectually oppose it, by firmness abroad and wisdom at home. She may avert a revolution by a prudent reform, and an unalterable union of the whole nation. What is passing at Rastadt must influence the fate of Switzerland, and *vice versa*.—Firmness in the Helvetic body may revive the courage of the Germans; the renovated vigour of the Germans may strengthen the firmness of the Helvetic body.

Since the 25th January, when this chapter was concluded, Switzerland is democratized with the

most fatal attendant circumstances. Should she by this sudden revolution form herself into one single body and nation—should she obtain the extinction of a federal system, ever feeble and disunited; should she have the wisdom to avoid dismemberment, and continue independent, she will suffer but half the evil of a revolution. But it is far more probable the French will keep something more than mere influence in that country, and that the violent democracy of the Swiss will be followed by that of Germany. This will happen unless, through the means of a general war with France, in which the Swiss (harrassed and plundered by these reformers) may take part, events should take place so favourable as to produce an universal peace, wherein the interests of Switzerland may be decided on with wisdom.

CHAP. V.

ITALY.

THE spirit of revolutions had ceased to disturb the peace of Italy from the period when Charles V. completed the destruction of liberty in that country. Except three or four feeble republics, a theocratic state, too weak to form a temporal, too stale for a spiritual power; and a kingdom erected for the House of Savoy by its great alliances, and secured by its position, the versatility of its politics, and other *circumstances*, (a term sufficiently vague to describe the blind decrees of fate, which none can either alter or evade) the Houses of Austria and of Bourbon had, after long and bloody wars, divided between them the rest of that delicious country.

This strange division of Italy consisted of the kingdoms of Sardinia and Naples; the four republics of Venice, Geneva, Lucca, and St. Marino, (for this last is also a free state); the three Duchies of Milan, belonging to the Emperor; Modena, of which he had the reversion, and Parma, belonging to a branch of the house of Bourbon; the grand Duchy of *Tuscany, belonging to the house of Austria; and lastly, the Ecclesiastical State.

* Thus has vanity created distinctions between dignities of the same class. In proof of this, we may instance the ridiculous title of the bishop of Liege, *Sa Celsitude*, which, though no one understood, conferred exalted dignity on its possessor.

These eleven sovereignties, so unequal and so different from each other, were governed by laws and forms of government of the most opposite nature. No country has been more fertile in writers on government and political economy than Italy. Yet none have in this respect been more under the influence of chance, or the arbitrary will of her governors.

The general character of the Italians is deep reflection, reserve, inseparable attachment to their mistress, and that indolence which arises from the excellence of their climate and the facility of agricultural production. Their country may be considered as the terrestrial paradise of Europe, and almost without labour spontaneously satisfies all the wants of man, and offers him the most luxurious productions of nature.

The Italians possessed every enjoyment but that of liberty. They were more distinctly than any other nation divided into three classes; nobles, who did nothing, driven by *ennui* around a circle of the most frivolous enjoyments, shabby splendour, etiquette and titles; citizens, who servilely exercised every mechanic art, at once bowing and laughing at a powerless nobility; and cultivators of the earth, who alone were raised almost to the dignity of freemen. Yet their rusticity, was the object of raillery and contempt among the inhabitants of cities, while they were revenged on their tyrannising Lords by badly paying them and reserving the best of their productions for themselves. No sooner had a townsman acquired a competence by trade and industry, or a countryman by his labour or the ruin of his lord, than they quitted their cast, and

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as the poor petty sovereigns of Italy were always driven to expedients for money, bought a parent of nobility, and passed their life in idleness, luxury and unprofitable idleness.

With such a character, whose great feature was habitual indolence, the revolutionary spirit could not have birth in Italy. Every idea of the Majesty of the People was there totally effaced, broken and destroyed, by this strange subdivision into petty sovereignties. Yet no country so adapted again to seize and propagate the idea, for in none had the people once been so majestic. For this, it was enough to awaken them from their lethargy, and present before their eyes the image of their ancient splendor.

Till the French revolution had passed the Alps, the Italians, who seldom read any public prints, which at best were partial and unfaithful, never formed themselves into political societies, because it was prohibited by the government. They, therefore, considered the French as madmen, whom their Imperial and Royal Majesties would quickly destroy. The reserve and apathy therefore of the Italians acquired new strength. Accustomed to their enjoyments and their slavery, they guarded themselves against this epidemic disorder, which seemed only calculated to disturb their tranquillity.

But they have beheld the King of Prussia forced into a peace with the French republic; Hesse, Saxony, and Swabia, successively detached from the German League; and Spain prevented from avenging the chief of her house, and the interests of its unfortunate branches, to form an alliance with France against England. They have beheld the Royal Defender of the Alps receiving

receiving the law of the vanquished; Holland conquered and revolutionised; the Austrians obliterating the memory of one defeat with the slaughter of another; the Imperial Armies driven with facility from the Milanese; and a nation, of whom they had till then entertained but a mean idea, covered with trophies. Since that period, the reflective character of the Italians, necessarily led them to place to account of liberty, that exalted energy by which the nation it inflamed, is rendered invincible. By this habit of reflection the popular ambition of the Italians was instantly awakened.

One circumstance accelerated the progress of the revolutionary spirit in Italy. The French invasion put tranquillity, indolence, and pleasure to the rout. Whatever moderation their conquerors were willing to employ, the necessity of provisioning and maintaining above 100,000 men forced this sober, indolent, and consequently, avaricious people, who preferred contentment to labour, to undergo the most toilsome exertions. They were forced to divide the fruits of the earth with conquerors, intent on plunder, who like their ancestors, the Gauls, entered their country naked and starving. Besides this, excessive contributions were levied on them. The Italians therefore diminished their burdens by sacrificing their sovereigns, their nobles, their clergy, and those phantom governments that had so feebly defended them from invasion.

And what was the consequence? Reflection has restored to the Italians their ancient popular dignity. The preaching and the example of the French, their own privations, and their wants, have accelerated this moral revolution. The
 Italians

Italians are an ingenious, a courageous, and an enterprising people. But their indolence drew a veil over their good qualities, from which the poinard of misery has at length torn it away. The House of Bourbon and the Germans have not been able to oppose this revolutionary explosion. Their rod of iron is broken, and the French, who now occupy the place of those ultramontane strangers, have a talent peculiar to themselves, of every where inoculating their principles and arriving at liberty by licentiousness. The Italians scarcely dreaded the French, whom they considered at the most as a momentary scourge, perhaps, as a beneficial storm; for they delivered them from the yoke of the *barbarians*. Perhaps, they imagined their conquerors could have no pretext either to establish themselves in their country, or to subjugate its inhabitants. Should they find they have been deceived, they will become their most implacable enemies.

Already have we seen the austere *Ascetisms* of Liberty springing up since the year 1789, among the indolent inhabitants of monasteries and of cities. Nobles, Monks, Priests, Lawyers and Physicians, have spread their Revolutionary writings throughout Italy, and have formed conspiracies that have always been discovered, suppressed, and punished—yet have ever sprung again into existence. Piedmont, Genoa, Rome, and Naples, have been most distracted by these disturbances. Venice has been exempted from them by means of her state inquisition and secret punishments. And Tuscany has defended herself against them by the precaution of her Government in wearing the mask of approbation towards all the excesses of French Jacobinism.

The revolutionary spirit, when it has thoroughly infected Italy, will however encounter an important obstacle in the clergy. Should the church be confounded with the deity, the ministers of religion with religion itself, the latter will be destroyed with the former as it was in France. Should the priests be enlightened by the terrible example of the French clergy, which is far from probable, and have the wisdom to separate spiritual from temporal objects, religion will still subsist, but will strengthen the Revolution even by teaching it moderation.

A second obstacle, the subdivision of Italy into petty sovereignties will, for a long time, prevent the Italians from forming themselves into a single nation. This division deprives Italy of the advantages of a common center or point of union, and may make the revolution of that country degenerate into a chaos of petty states, some Republican, some governed by Princes. And these will be continually destroying each other; as happened during the seven or eight centuries of blood, from the fall of the Western Empire to the time of Charles V.

This chaos, and the distractions and civil wars that will result from it, will constitute the first revolutionary epocha of that country, and can only cease when one or more of her petty nations shall have acquired sufficient strength to form a point of federal union, more solid than the Germanic body, the Helvetic Confederacy, or the United Provinces: Associations too weak to resist the more active ambition of one or more of their parts, or the shock of external force.

With regard to the union of all these subdivisions in one nation of Italians, resembling the
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Roman republic or that of France, it can only take place by means of conquest, as was the case with the former. In fact it is a chimera that cannot be attempted. The French Republic would not permit it from a regard their own interest. We cannot then in speculating on probabilities, foresee any thing more than a federative union of the different states of Italy. We ought, therefore, to consider them distinctly.

CISALPINE REPUBLIC.

WE shall begin this investigation with the Cisalpine Republic, as the eldest of the family.— This Republic principally consists of the Duchy of Milan : The rest of its territory is composed of the spoils of the Duke of Modena, and of some shreds taken from the Venetian Republic, and the Domains of the Pope.

No province of Italy vied with Lombardy in riches and fertility. Nature there anticipated the wishes of the inhabitants, and spared their labors. They were, therefore, the most inactive of all the Italians, the least disturbed by care, the most indifferent by whom they were governed. Secure from the attack of those subtle reasonings on liberty and political œconomy, that disturb the repose of nations without rendering them happy, the Lombards seemed totally destitute of every inclination to Republicanism.

The Milanese had ever been the theatre of war and of tyranny under her own Dukes. The houses of Austria and of France, had long disputed its possession. The blood of foreign armies had ever deluged the soil of Lombardy. But from the year

1748, and particularly since the treaty of Versailles in 1756, which put an end to the disputes between those powers, Lombardy had enjoyed the sweets of perpetual peace. From that period she was reconciled to the Austrian yoke. Their national antipathy at length almost subsided.

The Court of Vienna governed Lombardy with considerable mildness. It had the wisdom to employ Milanese troops in her armies, and opened the door of ambition and of honor to the nobility of that Duchy. She even drew from thence many excellent Officers, and many celebrated Generals. The police of Austria was severe as well in the Milanese, as in her other dominions, especially in regard to the Press. Liberty of thought, therefore, was there confined within very narrow limits, and the spirit of innovation had made but a small progress antecedent to the arrival of the French.

The Lombards, by being long accustomed to the yoke, by the restraints of a strict government, by continual communication with the different nations under the dominion of the House of Austria, by the advantages procured for their nobility in the armies of a warlike power, had almost exchanged their national character of Italians for that of Austrians. All their prejudices had taken the deepest root. That in favour of nobility was supported by a tribunal of heralds, instituted in 1770, as a repository for the proofs of nobility, and to enforce the laws concerning the order of nobles. Their government was military, and a council of war had even the superintendance of the affairs of the metropolis.

No province in Italy appeared less calculated for the reception of the revolutionary spirit: none
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of her inhabitants were so far from adopting the ideas of liberty and equality : none had less need of a change of constitution, or were less in a condition to effect it. No where had the spirit of philosophy made a smaller progress.

Whoever had taken a superficial view of France before the epocha of 1789, might have thought, that revolutionary dispositions were not more natural to that country than to Lombardy. But there was a considerable difference between them. Notwithstanding the precautions of authority against the liberty of thought, Voltaire, Rousseau, Freret, Boulanger, Helvetius, the Encyclopedists, the Œconomists, had for more than half a century, unremittingly attacked every species of prejudice, and even the most useful principles : thus undermining a government, at once feeble and destitute of dignity or foresight. The disorder of its finances had thrown it into the hands of the nation, and the nation violently resumed their rights.

On the contrary, the Lombards were neither enlightened, oppressed, nor miserable. They were no way prepared for a Revolution. Though French impetuosity, and the example of licentiousness (which always seduces the people, because they mistake it for the enjoyment of liberty) have misled them—on the other hand, the imprudence, the unaccommodating temper, the insolence, the avarice of their conquerors, would have reconciled them to their ancient master, had he but been able to preserve the possession of Mantua.

But the incredible successes of Buonaparte, the repeated defeats of the Austrians, and their being so shamefully forsaken, have caused democracy to triumph. The nobility having no firm ground to stand on have been crushed without resistance ; the

Cisalpine Republic exists, and Milan is its capital.

Already does this Republic maintain an army; already has she incurred a debt of sixty-three millions of livres; already does she exhibit the turbulence of a free nation; require wars for her subsistence, and pant for plunder and aggrandisement.

Democratic impetuosity led the French at first to exceed the bounds of wisdom and policy in favour of the Cisalpines. But the Directory soon corrected itself with regard to their true interests. It seemed natural that the little Republic of Genoa should be united to Cisalpinia. But France has taken advantage of their mutual aversion to ensure their separation. It is France that formed the decision, that Genoa should have a separate government, and a distinct constitution.

Notwithstanding the exertions of the Cisalpines to foment a revolt, the French Directory has prevented Piedmont from being revolutionised. The French Republic is the Ægis of the King of Sardinia against Cisalpine democracy. The Directory have good reason to prefer as a neighbour, a weak King to a restless and ambitious Democracy, whose governors already in their imprudent declamations, speak of reviving the Roman Republic. As long as the French keep Mantua, and an auxiliary force in Italy to protect Cisalpinia, or rather to keep her in subjection, the King of Sardinia has nothing to fear. But should circumstances cause the French to withdraw from Italy, that King will lose his crown, unless the same circumstances should involve the destruction of the Cisalpine Republic.

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The Duchy of Parma, under the protection of France, is a restraint to Cisalpine ambition, by giving her a boundary she is forced to respect. The Duke will be forced to cede to the republic his possessions beyond the Po, which will now become the barrier of his dominions.

But the cession of the dominions of Venice to the Emperor, the demarcation of the boundaries across the Lake of Garda and along the course of the Adige, and above all, the cession of Legnago, an advanced post, that in time of war may intercept the communication of Ferrara, Reggio, Modena, and Bologna, with Lombardy, are the greatest blow the Directory have aimed against the ambition of the Cisalpines.

The Directory employs the Cisalpine army against Rome. But she will pay them as she does her own soldiers, by giving them a share of the plunder: without suffering the republic to be aggrandized. The French appear throughout to have said to the Cisalpines, "We will that you be free; we command it. But we forbid you to arrogate the right of incorporation reserved to the *Parent-Republic*."

The severity of this law diminishes, no doubt, considerably the gratitude of the Cisalpines; who will emancipate themselves as soon as they are able, and will then become enemies to the founders of their liberty. In the mean time they rob all their neighbours, Piedmont, Parma, and even the Emperor for their new boundaries. They have begun a war on their own account against the Pope, whether of their own accord, or at the instigation of the French. It was the approach of their armies that caused the disturbances at Ancona, Civita-Vecchia, Pesaro, &c. and finally produced

duced the fall of Rome. They are revolutionary instruments in Italy. Yet it will probably be found they have not toiled for themselves, and this will augment their deep resentment.

The fate of the Cisalpine Republic is still precarious. It depends on what shall be determined at Raftadt. Should a general war take place, France too much occupied with her own affairs, will be unable to afford her succours sufficiently powerful; and the Cisalpines will either voluntarily return to the Austrian yoke, or be conquered. The rest of Italy will then be preserved from democracy. Should peace be made, the first war of the Cisalpines will be against France herself; and it will be caused by their resentment and their restless ambition.

SARDINIA, PARMA, TUSCANY, AND ROME.

THE three first of these would not furnish articles sufficiently interesting to be treated of apart. Their sovereignty is precarious; their lot humiliating and horrid. Harraffed by Italian democracy, protected with rigour by that of France, abandoned to the influence of the most arbitrary and extravagant plans of policy, they will vegetate, uncertain of their fate, till either the French Directory decree a general plan for *Republicanizing* Italy, or a revolution that is more than possible change the condition of democratic France, and consequently of her appendages, the Batavian, Lemanic, and Cisalpine Republics, &c. &c.

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The fate of Rome will probably be soon determined, and the expiring authority of the Pope buried with the present Pontiff, who now in his 80th year, is cursed with a longevity that has only witnessed his destruction. The fall of the Catholic Religion will be the consequence, and then even should circumstances change it will be difficult to re-establish it.

N A P L E S.

THE kingdom of Naples is better constituted, better situated, and more compact than that of Sardinia. It has not like that country dangerous neighbours, constant causes of war, and unavoidable routes and passes for troops. It is rich, though its population is not proportioned to its extent; and it has a considerable commerce, though susceptible of still greater activity. Its government has always been bad, and its inhabitants, particularly the Sicilians, turbulent. The Kings of Naples and of Sicily, have ever been ambitious and restless, or weak men governed by their courtiers, and influenced by external politics; which, considering their topographical situation, could never have affected them.

Sicily is severely oppressed by the finance, and very ill conducted in regard to culture, arts, and industry. The Kings of Naples, as well as those of Sardinia, ought to abandon their fixed residences, and divide their time with Cagliari and Sicily. The latter, indeed, deserves a decided preference. For the King would be richer, more powerful, more beloved and respected, as well

well as more secure from external influence at Palumo than at Naples. It would, however, be necessary to alternate his residence between those cities, that he might not weaken the attachment of the Neapolitans.

It is a most extraordinary fact, that the Neapolitan government has been continually employed ever since the year 1789, in discovering and suppressing conspiracies ever ready to spring up anew : that all these revolutionary movements have been excited by the nobles, priests, lawyers, and military officers : and that these have as yet been unable to excite a revolt of that very numerous class of true *Sans-Culottes*, the *Lazzaroni*, whose loyalty and devotion to their King have hitherto been proof against every attempt.

This class of men have, however, at various periods accomplished many dreadful revolutions. They for some time converted Naples into a Republic, or rather reduced it to anarchy, under the despotism of Massaniello and Gennaro, tyrants equally absurd with Marat and Robespierre, though not so cruel or so enlightened, and consequently less criminal.

There is no union between Naples and Sicily. That most dangerous principle of weakness, *divide et impera*, appears to be adopted by the Neapolitan government, which could not, however, but be a greater gainer by the union of those two people than by their division.

The Neapolitan is naturally attached to monarchy ; but as he has ever been governed by foreign Kings, he is but feebly attached to each dynasty, and is fond of change.

The Sicilian is naturally attached to republicanism. But should the revolutionary spirit disturb the tranquillity of that island, each city

would be desirous to form a republic, as in the time of Carthage and of Rome. The passions of these two nations are like their soil volcanic, and if a fermentation were once excited by means of pamphlets, periodical prints, clubs, and popular harangues, the revolution would be sudden and dreadful. Such a fermentation is extremely dangerous, when it acts of itself: it might be rendered extremely useful, if put in motion by their king.

The fate of the King of Naples is rendered extremely precarious by the catastrophe of Rome. The democratic army is on his frontiers; the French marine stationed at Corfu keeps him in awe. He will be obliged to become tributary to France, in order to keep his ground. But this state of uncertainty cannot long continue. Should peace be concluded at Rastadt, a pretext to quarrel with him will be found, and he will quickly be deprived of his crown. For his existence cannot accord with the revolutionary projects of France in Italy. Should a general war take place he may become the emancipator of Italy, and he cannot consistently with his own security adopt any other system.

GENOA.

NEVER has Genoa enjoyed a fixed constitution. Neither individuals nor the state were ever long at rest. Sometimes she belonged to the Emperors, sometimes to the Kings of France, to the Dukes of Milan, to Archbishops, or tyrannic individuals: to the Fregosi, the Adorni, or the Dorias. Sometimes was Genoa governed democratically by a plebeian,

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sometimes aristocratically by an Andrew Doria, to whom she owed her liberty, and that form of government which subsisted till the invasion of Italy. At another time wholly commercial, she covered the sea with her fleets, and ravaged them with her corsairs:—happiest since she fell from her ancient elevation and glory, and exchanged them for repose.

Such was this tempestuous republic, destitute of revenues, of troops, of navy, and of stability. Hated or despised by her subjects, she could neither govern, preserve, nor conquer Corsica. She even rejoiced to be relieved from the burden of possessing it.

The French revolution happened too near Genoa, not to cause some disturbance among a people so susceptible of fermentation, and whose history had presented a continual struggle between democracy and aristocracy. The Genoese are neither able to preserve their liberty, nor to bear a yoke. Thus the revolution they have embraced must necessarily bring upon them new calamities without procuring them one solid advantage.

Every commercial state, like Genoa, Geneva, or Hamburg, requires a moderate degree of liberty, and a simple and stable constitution, which ensures the most invariable respect to property. If the government is too aristocratic, it crushes commerce by the pride of rank and the devouring consumption of luxury. If too democratic, the lower classes are jealous and harass the merchant. The labourer then gives law to the manufacturer, the mariner to the ship-owner, and commerce and industry are driven away by a kind of anti-social equality.

Genoa has undergone a democratic revolution, though not without resistance and effusion of blood. Buonaparte, when he ensured her existence by aggrandizing her territory, gave the Genoese at his departure from Italy very wise and very *remarkable* advice.

Should the revolution be completed in Italy, Genoa will one day be the principal naval power of that country. And it is by sea she must then furnish her contingent to the confederacy. She will then create a navy to protect her coasts and her trade. If the port of Genoa is too small or too insecure for such an establishment, the Gulph of Spezia offers every accommodation to form a respectable navy. This station would be so much the more eligible, as it would give life to the *Riviera di Levante*, and Genoa being always necessarily a place of great trade, a navy that might interfere with this object would be more conveniently situated at some distance from it.

VENICE.

THE very idea of the ancient Republic of Venice, like the view of some monument of antiquity, impresses a kind of religious respect on the mind. Her history warms every heart that is susceptible of patriotism,—that is not insensible to the love of glory and of liberty. Yet her constitution was the severest satire on the human heart. Its foundation was suspicion, and its pillars machiavelism, despotism, and mystery. Venice since the league of Cambray, that last epocha of her splendor, was supported alone by

the refinements of her crafty policy. Her government having from that time disarmed her citizens, whose courage it had debased, and distrustful of the mercenaries to whom in all ages it confided its defence, possessed vast authority, but was totally destitute of strength.

Such a constitution might appear sufficiently good, and even wise and prudent, as long as the balance of Europe and the tranquillity of Italy rested on the policy of courts: whose projects might be frustrated by jealousy, inactivity, or want of power. The wars of Europe, and its revolutions, were then mere children's play. The constitution of Venice might pass for a *chef d'œuvre*, because it was adapted to the weakness and effeminacy of the age, and of all its social institutions. But it was not able to oppose or resist either the torrent of conquest, or the revolutionary spirit.

This government, so much esteemed and admired for its wisdom, was totally destitute of foresight. They had not calculated, that the French revolution substituting the people in place of the prince was changing the whole of the political system, and replacing the frivolous intrigues of courts by the vigorous and energetic action of liberty. They ought to have foreseen that unless they gave similar energy to their subjects they would be either carried away or overthrown by this revolutionary torrent. This government suppressed and fettered every passion: the revolutionary spirit has exalted them.

The constitution of Venice, like that of ancient Rome, concentrated all the power in the metropolis. But Rome sent forth victorious generals, and invincible legions composed entirely of Roman citizens. Every one was liable to military service,

service, and that service led to all the dignities of the Republic. The right of citizen extended to the inhabitants of every town and province. Most of the senatorial families were foreigners. It was not necessary to be born at Rome, nor even of Roman origin, either to be a Roman citizen, or to arrive at the highest dignities.

Venice was a metropolis of moderate extent; the center of a gloomy policy, of imbecility, and of aristocratic despotism. Destitute of activity, she spread the tranquillity of slavery over her provinces of *Terra-firma*, whose humiliated and apathetic inhabitants enjoyed, under a government in some degree mild, though at the same time jealous and severe, a sweet repose. A handful of untrained soldiers, ill-disciplined, without officers, without honor, without emulation, and without union, presented rather a multitude of *sbirri* than a regular army. Their fortresses were ancient, and had fallen to decay. Their navy was a mere nullity, and the last war of the Republic with the petty Regency of Tunis, proved how much her naval power had degenerated. Her peace with the States of Barbary had completed its destruction!

A national spirit, however, was spread even through the provinces of *Terra-firma*, and waited but for opportunity to display itself. Though the Lion of St. Mark slumbered, it was easy to rouse him. When he awoke, the wisdom of the senate should have directed his first steps. They might then have preserved the respect and even the attachment of the people; and converted to their own advantage that revolutionary spirit which the successes of France had established in Italy, and which doubtless would break out either
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against the governments that should unskilfully oppose it, or in favor of those that knew how to direct it.

In 1795, appeared a work, written with profound political knowledge, by the Count of Curti, on the dangers that menaced this government, and the reforms it needed. It was entitled, *Mémoires Historiques et Politiques sur la République de Venise en 1792*. He there proves satisfactorily, that her institutions were good, and that all the evil arose from the abuses of an oligarchical authority. He proves, that the abolition of the council of ten, and above all, of the three odious offices, of State-inquisitors, together with a revived activity in the four *Quarantie* would have alone restored to this wise constitution all its vigor.

But at the period when the worthy nobleman published that work with equal patriotism and moderation, notwithstanding the dangers that surrounded him, and the misfortunes of which he was the victim, the French revolution had not yet assumed that character of conquest and extension, which the feebleness, the perfidy, the unskilfulness of its enemies have given it, especially during the four last years. The French had not then passed the Alps. Italy still persevered in her pacific system; and the reforms proposed in that excellent work would yet have saved this Republic.

Now all is changed. The Republic therefore ought to have become respectable by her strength. Otherwise, she must either be oppressed or destroyed. To acquire this force, she ought not only to have totally annihilated the oligarchy that undermined her, but no longer concentrating the aristocracy in her metropolis, to have extended it
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over the whole of her dominions, and thereby united them in a common interest.

The first and most indispensable step was to have converted her *Helotes* of Terra-firma and Dalmatia into citizens, lest their first advance towards liberty should oppose the interests of the metropolis. She ought either to have committed her *golden book* to the flames, or have swelled it with all the principal families of her provinces. Of these she ought to have secured the attachment by giving them a share in the government.

She ought to have brought to light her hidden treasures, and to have excited the political ambition of the men thus regenerated, by civil and military offices: To have renovated her army and navy, and employed her senators in those departments; to have inspired them with sentiments of honor and of patriotism; to have repaired and garrisoned her forts; and to have seriously prepared to repel the evils which the enthusiasm of liberty produces, when the government does not direct its steps.

With these measures which would have speedily rendered Venice a vigorous and a respectable Republic; she would have had no cause to fear the turbulence of the revolutionary spirit, which, in that case, would rather have been beneficial by restoring her ancient energy. The government would no longer have been compelled to support its authority by distrust and mystery. The *lions mouths* in her cities would then have been closed; her spies, her informers, her council of ten, and her three grand inquisitors of state, in whom resided the whole action of this narrow government, would have vanished.

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This is the kind of revolution every true philanthropist would have desired for the Republic of Venice: and of such a revolution that wise and ingenious people were worthy. Such a revolution, or rather such a reformation would have been a model for the rest of Italy. It might have rendered Venice the center, or at least the principal member of her federal union, whenever that country had experienced all those changes which the revolutionary spirit must necessarily produce in half a century at most, and probably in a much shorter period.

Venice is no more. But she will one day resume her freedom. It is easier to pass from slavery to liberty, than to become habituated to the former after having enjoyed the latter. We may even predict, that it is by Italy the French will be punished for their rage in revolutionizing all nations.

CHAP. VI.

T U R K E Y.

THE revolution of Turkey is an unavoidable consequence of that of Italy. Even should the French respect their ancient alliance with the Porte, and be too intent on their commercial interests to excite the Greeks to recover their ancient importance and break the fetters of a dreadful slavery, the Italians, regenerated to liberty and enthusiastically fond of novelty, will send forth a cloud of missionaries across the Adriatic Gulf.

The revolutionary propaganda that preaches the principles of democracy, is still more active than the propaganda of religion. In this age of reasoning, religious intolerance is at length extinguished. But as men seem destined to torment each other on account of opinions, political intolerance has succeeded it. And thus no sooner is democracy triumphant, than it spreads inquietude and turbulence around.

If powerful republics have a natural antipathy to royalty, democratic republicans add to this sentiment the hatred of aristocracy. Democracy is timid and suspicious. Its action depends on numbers. It ungenerously and without scruple employs the strength of a thousand against one. But if these thousand men see twenty or thirty oppose them, fear seizes and drives them to ferocity. Ever in alarm at the least appearance of united opposition, democracy persecutes aristocracy even to extinction; and this not only within its boundaries,

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but beyond them and every where around. The more numerous democracy is, the more is it desirous to increase. This constitutes its whole political system. With unremitting activity it struggles to overthrow every government that opposes it, and none is more opposed to it than that of Turkey.

The French were not willing to leave the Italians either the *glory* or the advantage of regenerating the Greeks. They have thrown an obstacle in the way of their communication by ceding Venice and Dalmatia to the house of Austria. They have taken monarchy itself as a barrier against the revolutionary torrent. The *Parent-republic* is willing to produce an offspring, but she is jealous of her own fecundity, and desires none but sterile children.

France then has reserved to herself all the advantage, all the profit of revolutionising European Turkey. And for this end she has founded a department on the coast of Albania in the Ionian sea. This department is rather military than commercial. Corfu is not favourably situated for commerce with the Archipelago; but it is a formidable naval station. The possession of Larta (the ancient Larissa) gives her a footing on that part of the Ottoman continental dominions. In these two places will be prepared the books destined to enlighten and electrify the Albanians and the Macedonians, already in revolt against their sovereign, and whose revolutionary impulse it is merely necessary to direct. There will then exist a chain of democratic territory, extending as far as Saloniki, whence the revolution will spread into the islands of the Archipelago. One of its branches will extend to Laconia and Attica,
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another to Constantinople, and the isle of Candia will be roused from that of Corfu.

The rivalship of England will redouble the activity of these measures. Her commerce, totally ruined in the Levant, will be entirely in the hands of France. And the Greeks, after confining the Turks within the limits of Asia, will establish one or more democracies, whose strength will enable them to throw off their dependence on the *parent republic*. But before they acquire that independence, France will long enjoy her superiority in the Levant.

The establishment of the French at Corfu, where they have collected all the navy and all the stores of the Venetian arsenal, is an insurmountable obstacle to the chimerical project of the house of Austria, of having naval establishments in the Mediterranean. The French will confine that power to coasting the Adriatic Gulf, and will not suffer the Imperial flag to expand beyond its limits. They will have it in their power to cramp its trade, to intercept it, and to destroy it, whenever they shall decide its destruction.

Every friend to humanity must wish for the emancipation of the Greeks; that brilliant nation of descendants from Miltiades, Solon, Socrates, Epaminondas, and Aristides; from painters, sculptors, philosophers, and poets; who, after twenty centuries have intervened, continue still to be our models. It has in all ages been the wish of philosophy to behold the barbarous Ottomans confined within the limits of Asia, and with them their fanaticism, their despotism, and their ignorance. But considering the circumstances of the times, the consequences of this event will be

dreadful to the repose of Europe. They will complete its disorder and its confusion.

It is by Albania that the Polish legion of Dombrowski, reinforced by Arnians, Bosnians, and Greeks, will arrive at their frontiers and in the Ukrain, in order to reassemble and regenerate the Polish nation. It is by means of that regenerated nation that Russia will experience the vengeance of France, and be infected with the revolutionary spirit, whose extended arms embrace the whole of Europe, which is covered by its wings of fire.

CHAP. VII.

R U S S I A.

THE Russian empire, in consequence of its remoteness, the dispersion of its population over an immense extent of territory, the diversity of its languages, manners, and religions, the fanaticism of the reigning sect, the profound ignorance of all classes of her citizens, the preponderance of the Court, in which all the intelligence of the empire centers, the splendor of her throne, whence all rewards and distinctions flow; the punishments, the riches, the misery of the country; the union of power under the yoke of a most numerous and obedient army; has hitherto never had any cause of alarm but from the intrigues of courts, the revolts of a few barbarous provinces, or the revolutions of the imperial family.

Petersburg

Petersburg is not only the head but the heart of the empire, in which all the channels of its political existence anastomise. The tragical events that frequently disturb and stain the throne with blood, are incidents which the people behold without interest or emotion, because they have no influence on their well-being. The Crown may be worn by a man or by a woman, and its possession be procured by crimes and violence : to the nation it is matter of indifference ; he who wears it is the sovereign and is obeyed.

It appears that such a government should be secure from the attacks of the revolutionary spirit : that such a nation is insensible to its influence. A people who never read, who know nothing, who have not even a newspaper, are even ignorant that there exists a great nation, who, after a series of metaphysical discussions, have overturned a throne that had stood fourteen centuries, have propagated their opinions by the bayonet, and conquered all the nations of Europe.

There is however a great city in that empire where science is increasing and where hatred and jealousy of the court rally the principles of independence ; those germs of future republicanism. That city is Moscow. Already the asylum of malecontents and critics, it will one day be a focus of revolution.

Catharine II. appeared to regard the French revolution as a political game, which she might convert to her own advantage by lighting up the conflagration, by encouraging the French princes with great promises and slender services, by urging Austria and Prussia with her alliance to a war, that, whatever should be its result, must weaken them, and by joining the English navy with one
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of her squadrons, to discipline her marine without risking its safety.

Having accomplished her object, by engaging Prussia and Austria in a war with France, she thought the moment was arrived when she might seize the rest of Poland. This was the motive of the peace concluded by Prussia with France, that she as well as Austria might have a share in the plunder. Thus was the ambitious project of the Empress frustrated.

The defection of the king of Prussia gave a mortal blow to the coalition; the empress was still more indifferent to the general interest, and confined herself to affording the emigrants a trifling pecuniary aid. Her successor has more nobly discharged that political obligation to the house of Bourbon, by offering an honourable asylum to the unfortunate heir of Louis XVI. and by compensating with an advantageous establishment the persevering courage of Condé's army, and the virtue of that prince, which has procured him the esteem of all Europe, and even of the most furious democrats of France.

This line of conduct has, like all half measures, done more harm than good. The French revolution has thereby acquired more solidity, and Russia has lost the influence she might have enjoyed over the rest of Europe; by either joining the coalition with an irresistible force, or by reserving herself for a respectable mediation.

Now her fate depends as absolutely as the rest of Europe on the result of the congress of Rastadt. Should peace be concluded, should Germany be dismembered, and Switzerland subjugated and democratised, as will in all appearance be the case, the revolutionary spirit, meeting no obstacle to its progress,

progress, will spread with rapidity over Turkey, which the Poles, formed in Buonaparte's school, will traverse, to re-enter their native country through Bukowina and the Ukrain, while the French, sailing out of Constantinople, will attack the Crimea.

Political embarrassments will no doubt combine their force with this revolutionary war. The Persians in Asia, and the Swedes towards Petersburg, will take advantage of the distress of Russia to recover the provinces of which she has plundered them. Despotism will sink beneath democracy, and this colossal empire will have lasted but a century.

Russia can only exist by the rupture of the Congress at Rastadt, by an armed mediation for the preservation of the German integrity, and by a general and most energetic war with the common enemy, or a universal peace, that may establish the tranquillity of Europe on the most solid basis.

CHAP. VIII.

SWEDEN.

THIS power seems to have three distinct and opposite interests in the turn the affairs of Europe may take. The first is to have no share in the contest; to watch the progress of the revolutionary spirit; to hold herself in readiness to take advantage of it as soon as it shall attack the Empire of Russia, in order to shake off her slavery to the Court of Petersburg, to recover her ancient boundaries, to extend them to the Neva, and by gaining possession of Petersburg, to secure herself the Province of Livonia.

The second interest of Sweden regards Royalty in particular. It is to frustrate the negotiations at Rastadt, and unite in the common cause of kings against Democracy.

The third regards the prosperity of her subjects. It is to oblige France to rescind her Decree against neutral vessels, and in order to avoid oppression on the part of the respective belligerent powers, to form a naval coalition, either with Denmark, Hamburg, Lubec, Naples, Turkey, and America, or a similar alliance with England, in order to prevent an invasion. For should that attempt succeed, it will ruin Sweden, cause universal bankruptcy, complete the subjugation of Europe to the unbounded power of the French Directory, and be quickly followed by the extinction of Royalty, the destruction of every Constitution, and that general disorganization which for a cen-
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ture at the least would consign the Universe to Anarchy.

Of these three interests, the first is conjectural and uncertain: the other two are immediate and direct.

As a member of the Empire the King of Sweden should dread the shame and danger of suffering the Germanic body to be dissolved, and a Democracy, which would render his German possessions extremely precarious, established in its place. That Prince has therefore the strongest interest in the negotiations at Rastadt, and peace can only be desirable to him, should the French, by his mediation, accede to the integrity of the Empire, restore the Bishopric of Basil, and secure the tranquillity of Switzerland by withdrawing their own troops from the Pays de Vand, and the Cisalpines from the Valteline.

CHAP. IX.

DENMARK.

THE interest of Denmark in the negotiations at Rastadt is more direct than that of Sweden. To her the effects of Peace are infinitely more important. She cannot be ignorant that Holstein is revolutionarily prepared in a manner the most active and the most dangerous. Her wise neutrality has procured her considerable advantages, but she has incurred the evil of laying open her dominions, especially those in Germany

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to the French propaganda, which has not failed to make a considerable progress.

The safety of Denmark depends either on the integrity of the Empire, or a general war with the Democrats of France. The first alone would be inadequate, long to retard the æra of her ruin. Should France, dreading a general confederacy, content herself with the Meuse for a boundary, she will but prepare with the more activity during a short peace, acceded to with reluctance, to cultivate those seeds of disorganization she has sown along the Rhine, and even beyond it, as well as in Switzerland, in Italy, and in Turkey. As soon as those seeds begin to vegetate she will renew the war.

Hamburg is of all others the most important source of uneasiness to Denmark. Should a peace concluded at Rastadt, confirm to France the boundary of the Rhine, the Empire will be dissolved. Hamburg will then perhaps form an indemnity for one of the great powers of Germany: an event that will give an active and dangerous neighbour to the German dominions of Denmark, which towards the Elbe are open and defenceless. The Prince who shall then usurp that City, will either ruin her Commerce by a military government, or by the possession of the Elbe, attempt to render that commerce exclusive at the expence of Altona and Glückstadt.

Perhaps protected by France, Hamburg will continue free. She will then be a democratic Colony, and focus of the propaganda, whence missionaries will spread through Hanover, Prussia, Mecklenburg, and Holstein. Hamburg will then be the place from whence the dæmon of Revolution will ravage the North of Germany.

Perhaps

Perhaps the King of Denmark will take advantage of the system of partition to usurp Hamburg and Lubec. But these two Cities rich, populous, and republican, will not easily be held in subjection. After having ruined him by expensive wars, they will re-conquer their liberty and democratize his dominions. Denmark, however, has no claim to a share in the system of partition. She has remained neutral and unmolested, and cannot therefore demand an indemnity.

Lastly, perhaps the King of Denmark solicited by these two Hanseatic Cities, and pursuing a system of moderation and of justice characteristic of his Councils, will declare himself the protector of Hamburg and of Lubec. In that case, he will be at war with the powers interested in the partition, who, being supported in their pretensions by France, may eventually crush him. Or France ever consistent in her revolutionizing system will persist in her protectorship, preserve her influence in Hamburg, and render it more submissive to her will than it could have been to his. Against no evil therefore will this palliative defend him.

Should France, in order to avoid a general war, accede to the integrity of the Empire, peace will be concluded at Rastadt, and the German Plenipotentiaries not rising above the sphere of present and surrounding interest, will believe they have accomplished wonders; not foreseeing that France adopts a moderation repugnant to her principles, solely in order to remove every obstacle to her grand project of invading England; a project, which if successful, would involve Europe in universal ruin and bankruptcy.

Here then a maritime and commercial interest no less important than her territorial danger opens

itself to Denmark. A Decree of the Councils and Directory of France has already given a fatal blow to her trade. What will be the result should the French annihilate the power of England, dismember her dominions, rob her of her colonies, destroy her navy, and plunge her in democratic anarchy. These turbulent and insatiable Republicans will then rule the sea with still more tyrannic sway. Not a flag will then wave but by their permission. Every maritime power will become tributary to them, and none will be secure from their depredations. They will regard the toll collected at the Sound as a feudal right. They will domineer in Copenhagen, in the Baltic, and in the Elbe. They will oblige all the powers of the North to deliver to them exclusively, the materials of naval architecture, and Democracy will complete by sea what her armies have begun by land.

The safety or destruction of Denmark does not then alone depend on the negotiations of Rastadt. That kingdom has other most important interests, not only in the failure of an English invasion, but in preventing the attempt. Denmark as a maritime and commercial power must compel France to rescind her tyrannical Decree against the free navigation of neutral vessels, whether by a most active armed neutrality, or by uniting with England, Russia, and Sweden, to render the projected invasion abortive.

Russia, Sweden, and Denmark must be the *forced* mediators of the negotiations at Rastadt. The Plenipotentiaries of the Pope, of Naples, Cisalpinia, Sardinia, Tuscany, Switzerland, America, Spain, Portugal, and England, must be admitted to its sittings. In lieu of a mere Congress
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of the Empire, it must be a Congress of the Universe, and a sacred armistice during its whole continuance established. Its result must be a general peace, stipulating the respective topographic interests, and guaranteeing the existence of all the powers that compose it.

In fine, Denmark can only be saved by a general war or a universal peace.

CHAP. X.

E N G L A N D.

NO power is more seriously threatened by the revolutionary spirit, no power can feel more fatally the malignant influence of the French Revolution, or be more speedily crushed or saved in consequence of the Congress of Rastadt, than England.

Without tracing either the causes or consequences of a dreadful war which has eluded the calculations and deceived the hopes of all Europe, we cannot but admire that balance of success which has preserved the scales between France and England equal, constantly rendering the one invincible by land, the other by sea. Both these nations have made considerable conquests on their own elements; each, when the others appeared exhausted and discouraged, displaying more energy and resources, because they alone
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know the real force of patriotism, and consequently, with them alone it is an universal spring of action.

We shall soon perceive whether the Swifs, who are in like manner attached to their country and representative government, whereby the subject is identified with the sovereign, are equally susceptible of patriotism. If they are not, this want of virtue, with the same spring of action, must be attributed to the defects of a fœderal constitution, which by the division of individual, absorbs the general interest. Of this Holland and the Germanic body furnish us a striking example.

In this ferocious conflict between the French and English, the glory of the former has been more brilliant as well as more difficult to acquire. The French have displayed greater courage, the English more address. While the latter had an excellent navy, the former have had every thing to create. Had not the French been necessitated to sustain an universal war, that employed all their talents, and all their population, they would in a short time have equalled, perhaps surpassed, the English, both in number of ships and sailors. Of this two recent events are a sufficient proof.

Louis XIV. whose ambition aspired to universal glory, willed to have a navy; and a navy was speedily created. Louis XVI. wanted ships to succour the Americans; and in two years he increased their number to eighty. But as Louis XVI. then waged against England a war of coalition, he experienced all the misfortunes usually resulting from combined plans against an enemy whose interest, whose will, and whose mode of action were but one.

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In 1779, the descent on England failed by the dilatory movements of Spain. At another time the defection of Holland frustrated their operations. Avarice and disunion caused the loss of a decisive battle, and all the efforts of the last king of France were unavailing.

In the present revolutionary war the French navy has been disorganized. Twenty ships given up at Toulon have weakened, and two naval engagements destroyed it. All the efforts, the ability, and the courage of the French, were directed against the neighbouring nations who threatened to destroy their liberty. Their victorious arms have spread depredation and terror far and wide. They have abandoned to the English the empire of the sea, yet have not remained wholly inactive themselves. Their privateers have occasioned considerable losses to the English commerce as well in the Indian as the American and European seas. One of their squadrons has destroyed the Newfoundland fisheries. They have reconquered Corsica; they have driven the British from the Mediterranean; they have reinstated their navy at Toulon; their Brest fleet is recovering and they have acquired a new one at Venice and Corfu: In fine they are now most seriously meditating a descent on England.

It would be very imprudent to regard this project as chimerical. Should the war be renewed, its execution is certainly impossible. But should the French only have England to contend with, they will by perseverance accomplish their intentions. The mechanical part of a navy may be compassed by money and population; the technical part is taught by practice, by glory, and by rewards.—The French are possessed of a bold enterprising spirit,

spirit, which renders them susceptible of every species of instruction and of labour. These reflections cannot escape the English Government, and must occasion it much disquietude.

England, having experienced in her own troops, particularly at Toulon and Dunkirk, the invincibility of the French by land, has beheld her allies successively abandon her after having exhausted her by ample subsidies. The Congress at Rastadt is calculated to rob her of her last resources, by depriving her of the means of causing a diversion. The influence resulting from this Congress on the fate of England is decisive.

Should peace be made between France and the Empire, the British fleet, already driven from the Mediterranean, will not have a single port in Europe. They will be excluded from the trade of Bremen, Hamburg, the Baltic, and the North. Privateers will be multiplied in all the ports that still continue neuter. Their manufactures, already languid, will entirely fail. The commodities of their immense colonies will be intercepted, or rot in their warehouses, while the unavoidable expence of numerous squadrons will ruin the country.

The opposition to Government, the revolutionary spirit, the discontents of multitudes of artificers deprived both of work and bread, the decay of commerce, the distrust which failures and partial bankruptcies will produce in mercantile transactions, the embarrassment of the Bank, the activity of the French in fomenting discord throughout the three kingdoms, the necessity of maintaining a numerous army to protect the coasts from insult, the encreasing expensiveness of these disbursements, the danger of keeping the whole nation armed amid the discord and innovation

which agitates it: this combination of real calamities is sufficient to exhaust the resources and the courage of the nation, which derives all its strength from its riches and its commerce, even should the French not employ more decisive measures against it.

What will be the consequence, if the French, directing all their strength and industry towards their navy, obstinately determine to accomplish a descent?

And here we must tear off the veil of illusion, and prove the descent to be possible. Those floating citadels, on which England relies, are subject to the caprice of the element on which they move. Already have we beheld a squadron escape two English fleets, and carry the troops commanded by General Hoche to Bantry Bay, whence it was only driven by the winds, having had upwards of four days free from any obstacle to effecting a descent. Had it succeeded, Ireland would have been lost. She would have been separated from England, and thenceforth become its enemy.

Already have we beheld a flotilla of four frigates cast forth upon the coast of Wales the scum of the banditti of France, without being able yet to discover the object of that hideous expedition, which spread terror even to the capital itself, because the telescope of fear magnified the object to one party, and that of desire to the other. These two trials have been made—the one without, the other at the very mouth of the British Channel, and they succeeded.

Every naval man must know, that this channel confined between two high lands, has a constant current running at the rate of three leagues an

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hour, both at ebb and flow; that there the winds are constant and periodical, from east to west, and from west to east; that their variations are trifling and of short duration; and consequently that a squadron can never block up a port on a fixed station, because it will be carried off by currents and by winds, especially when both are in the same direction; that it requires the greatest skill, and the most laborious exertions, to be continually tacking so as to keep always to windward, and not be carried away by the currents from the intended station; that it is necessary frequently to return to port for water, to put the sick on shore, and to repose and reanimate the health of the crew*.

It is well known to seamen, that in the narrowest parts of the channel, to cross from one coast to the other, with the assistance of wind and tide, requires but a few hours; that one night is sufficient for the passage; that the Channel is frequently covered with fogs, which may favor both the departure and the arrival: This every seaman knows; none of them doubts that a ship leaving the coast of France for a fixed destination in England may escape the cruisers.

It will be objected, that what one ship may accomplish cannot apply to an expedition which demands a great assemblage of soldiers, cannon, horses, ammunition, provisions, transports, and ships of war. This objection, though it may appear to have weight, is merely plausible.

There are two modes of making a descent on England; one by a complete army, brought over

* During the war of 1778, the squadrons of Johnstone and Carteret remonstrated against the unprofitable and fatiguing station of the Channel, proceeded from murmur to revolt, and obliged their commodores to return to port.

in merchantmen convoyed by a numerous fleet, endeavouring by main force to gain the English coast, to repulse the fleets which would obstruct their passage, and the troops which would oppose their landing; and afterwards to protect, by its formidable artillery, the establishment of this army, till maritime assistance were no longer needful either for its establishment or subsistence.

This is not physically impossible to execute; but the superiority of the English is so great, both in skill and naval force, that every probability is against the success of such an attempt.

1st. There is no French port in the Channel where such a fleet could be collected. It must therefore be divided among several ports, as was very badly arranged in 1779 between Havre, St. Maloes, and Brest.

2dly. An inclosed road or a safe anchorage would be requisite, where these divided bodies might rendezvous undetected convoy of a great fleet of war, in order to set sail together, and there is not one such on the coast of France, even Cherbourg is insufficient.

3dly. The preparations must be very slow and and very expensive. The project will be known; the enormous preparations will be a guide to the cruisers and squadrons of the English; and the necessary passage of vessels along the coast between the place of rendezvous, and the other ports will be easily intercepted.

4thly. The part of the English coast menaced by the known point of departure, will be fortified with greater care, and reinforced with more troops and artillery.

5thly. The winds that are favourable at the point of departure will be contrary to the junction of the fleet which must convoy it.

6thly. The English fleet being acquainted with the preparations, may chuse whether to attack the French fleet before or after this junction with the convoy, by which it will be embarrassed. In either case, should the French fleet be beaten, the expedition will fail, whether the convoy remain in the ports, or be destroyed after the defeat; and every probability indicates that the French would be beaten.

7thly. If, before or during the engagement, the convoyed army should reach the coast of England, and attempt a landing, its fate will depend on the issue of the naval action, and it will find on shore so much the more resistance, as the English will rely on the preximity of the fleet.

8thly. Say what they will, should the French be unsuccessful, ruined by so great an effort, stripped of their last naval forces, they will not again attempt so rash an enterprize, and will terminate with shame and disgrace, a war by which they have acquired so much glory, and all their laurels will be faded; their colonies, as well as those of their allies, will become a prey to their haughty enemies; and perhaps the powers on whom at Rastadt they will have imposed too severe conditions, will take advantage of their disaster and attack them anew.

The other mode to attempt a landing in England is partial; it may either be executed from many points at once, or in succession. It neither requires large transports nor ships of the line to escort them. The preparations extending from Holland to Brest threaten more points, attract less notice, are less expensive, and more practicable.

Gun boats, bomb boats, frigates, and corvettes, constitute all the naval force, and can alone be useful against the batteries on the coast. *Chasse-marées* and boats with decks may easily convey the troops, the cannons, and their carriages as ballast, together with ammunition, and eight days provisions. There are upwards of 1500 of these *chasse-marées* on the French coast of the channel, between Brest and Dunkirk, and almost as many from Dunkirk to East Friesland. Each of these boats, for a passage of twenty-four hours, may carry 100 men with one piece of cannon, its carriage and ammunition in the hold. These boats run aground without danger; and the disembarkation is performed with facility. They are excellent sailors: the men are bold, and the masters are perfectly acquainted with the English coasts. In three days time 200 of these boats may very easily be brought together at any part of the coast. The troops may be collected in the same space of time, at a given point. The embarkation of dismounted artillery, of some horses with their forage, ammunition, dry provisions, and medicines, may be completed in three hours, and the disembarkation in the same.

Forty gun-boats of the new model, each carrying two twelve-pounders and four horses, make the advanced guard, and may even be drawn ashore by means of their false keels. They cover the shore by means of their fire, and secure an undisturbed landing. Ten sand-bags per man, as many pallsades and pick-axes, afford the means of entrenchment.

This fleet may easily convey to England 10,000 foot and 500 horse; and the time of departure depending on their own choice, it is almost impossible

possible for cruisers to intercept them.—One division of gun-boats may remain with the troops; the others, with the *chasse-marées*, may return to the point of departure, and be every night employed in bringing provisions for the entrenched camp, which the enemy's ships drawing too much water, and not daring to expose themselves to the red-hot shot of the camp batteries and gun-boats, cannot approach.

On the southern and eastern coast of England, which is very much indented, are an infinity of points, susceptible of such a descent, of the importance of which the English themselves perhaps are not aware. And this method of landing may be employed at once on many parts of the British coast, with equal secrecy, celerity, and success.

It will be objected, that a corps of 10,000 men is a mere handful, which cannot resist the numerous army the English will bring against them. This might be true, if that multitude could immediately be brought to act against the French before they were entrenched. But that cannot take place: and once entrenched, they must be regularly besieged.

A like number of men, in the entrenchments of earth at Fort Kehl, stopped during two months an Austrian army, not only numerous, but at that time victorious, better trained to war than the English, and provided with able engineers, good besieging artillery, and excellent cannoneers. The English cannot flatter themselves with the idea of carrying, at the first onset, entrenchments lined with 10,000 French inured to war, and a formidable artillery.

Once engaged in the delays of a siege, without experience in this kind of war, without skilful generals,

nerals, engineers, siege artillery, fearing similar expeditions on many other parts of the coast which they dare not leave unprotected; the patriotism of the military will cool, the expence increase, trade be annihilated, and individual bankruptcies, unavoidable failures of payment, the consternation of the towns, of the country, and of manufacturers; and, above all, the discontent of the people and the revolutionary spirit, will hurry on disorder and confusion. Then will the resource of the English, even before a defeat, be a humiliating and dear bought peace, should the French, who have not virtue to set bounds to their victories, have the moderation to consent to it.

Let us suppose the most favorable case for England, that the French be repulsed in the first attempt; this will surely not take place at the moment of descent. Every man who understands tactics knows that it is impossible to prevent a landing. It will only take place after the siege of their entrenchments, which will have been forced, and themselves put to the sword or taken prisoners. What is the loss of 10,000 men to France, who will at least have cost England an equal number? France will correct her plans and begin anew.

We must conclude, 1st. That a descent in a mass on England or Ireland is subject to enormous difficulties and great inconveniences, but that it is not physically impossible; that an army of from 60 to 80,000 men once landed in England may subsist there without wanting to be victualled by sea; that from the disposition of the English nation, from the ascendancy which democracy is gaining throughout Europe, it will find partisans and resources in a country, rich, abundant, and
entirely

entirely open: that such an army is sufficient to march to London, reduce England to subjection, destroy royalty, and change the constitution.

2dly. That one or more partial descents are much more easy to accomplish, have nearly the same effect, and form the advanced guard of the grand descent by securing a footing in the country.

3dly. That the threat alone of a grand descent keeps all England in alarm, and ruins it by fatiguing cruises, by arming the coasts, and by a standing army. And that England cannot support this state of perplexity during so long a period as France can continue to hold out the phantom.

4thly. That the threat of a grand descent can only cease by a general war against France, which might occupy elsewhere the forces destined for this project, or rather this phantom, or by an universal peace. That it is at Rastadt that one or the other must be decided. That thus the fate of England wholly depends upon the result of the negotiations at Rastadt.

It is proved under the chapter on Denmark, that the interest of the maritime powers requires that the project of a descent on England not only fail, but that it cease to exist. The continental powers have the same interest: The universal bankruptcy which would follow it, all the specie of Europe in the hands of a nation greedy and uncontrouled, all the power by land and sea united in it, would leave no bounds to its ambition and rapacity, which have always been known to increase in proportion to its success. The fall of every throne, the annihilation of all political, civil, and religious constitutions, would be the fatal result.

Democracy

Democracy would devour all Europe, and finish by devouring itself.

CHAP. XI.

SPAIN.

SPAIN, since the epocha of the French revolution, has passed through every gradation of debasement. Situated at the extremity of Europe, destitute of neighbours who might support her, constantly defeated, panic struck by the successes of the French, and still more by the revolution,—it was natural for her to abandon the confederacy, and make a separate peace.

To discover through what motives this branch of the house of Bourbon became allied with the murderers of the Chief of her family against England, we must grope amid the chaos of court intrigue, and the dark cavern of the human passions. It was a step at once repugnant to the interests of Spain, and to the maxims of sound policy.

Spain had declared war against France, without foreseeing that she would require an army by land. She had been punished for it by her defeats. Yet this first lesson did not correct her improvidence. Before she engaged in a war against England, she should have calculated that the navy of France

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being destroyed, the whole weight of the war must fall upon herself: that to struggle with so formidable an enemy, she only possessed an inert and inexperienced navy; that her vast colonies were open and defenceless; that her galleons, returning with cargoes of silver, would be exposed to plunder, or, being unavoidably delayed, might occasion her finances to be embarrassed.

What advantage could she expect from the issue of the war, even supposing the events to be wholly favourable to herself and her ally? Did she expect to become mistress of Portugal and Gibraltar? But these expeditions cannot succeed without the aid of a French army. Such an army, when stationed in Spain, must be fatal to her. It would annihilate all the advantages of both these conquests, either by introducing into Spain a moral and religious disorganization, or by violently destroying, in spite of the Court, the incoherent alliance of the two nations, through mutual antipathy and the indignation of Spanish prejudices against French immorality.

These two expeditions would be slow, expensive, and uncertain. Their immense disbursements would fall on Spain alone. The French must even be compensated by new cessions, which in all probability would open the Spanish colonies on the continent of South America to the fatal effects of French activity. Should even her colonies remain entire, and the compensations be made at the expence of Portugal, France would demand a part, if not the whole, of the Brasils. What eligible neighbours for the Spanish Court!

Does she expect, by combining their naval strength, to give success to the invasion of England?

Not

Not a nation in Europe has a stronger interest than Spain in the failure of a project which would give France the empire of the seas, and make her mistress of the world. Spain may often experience humiliations, and even real injuries, from the haughty English government; but England can never form a project to destroy her commerce, or conquer her colonies. She has an interest, on account of her own mercantile relations, to treat her with mildness; and temper her superiority with moderation.

It is not the same with France. Though she succeed in conquering and disorganizing England, either she will subjugate Spain like Holland and Switzerland, or if Spain, when it is too late, would shake off the yoke, she will make her feel all the weight of her vengeance. The least she can expect is, that France will seize her commerce with the Indies, and fix stations of her own in Mexico and Peru. Then will the revolutionary spirit, whose progress is independent of the policy of France, and which often opposes and frustrates the measures of her government, without even suffering that government to direct it, begin it's apostolic labours among the oppressed Indians and discontented colonists. Their active democracy will murder their viceroys, break all their connections with the mother country, carry on an exclusive commerce with France in the European manufactures; and the empire of the Indies will be lost.

Spain herself will be catechumenised like her colonies. Democracy will shake the Spanish throne, and dash to pieces her two and twenty crowns. This fine country will be divided into as many confederate or distinct republics as it is now composed of provinces. Such is the system the French have

displayed in Italy. Such is the true policy of the *parent-republic*. Destruction to kings, democracy to their territories, the formation of small republics, and the prevention of great national confederations, that Frenchmen may alone enjoy universal and uninterrupted dominion.

To them such a system will be extremely advantageous. For those republics will become their tributaries, and thus, by diminishing their internal taxation, cause the whole country to abound in wealth.

Spain is at present thrown out of her political orbit, and must desire to return to it. The alliance of her King with the French Republic is burdensome, monstrous, and dangerous. Her disputes with England are trifling; the grievances detailed in her manifesto prove it. By England the vanity of the Spanish Monarch might be wounded; by France his very existence is endangered.

The safety of Spain depends then on that of England, and consequently on the congress of Rastadt. It depends on a general war or an universal peace.

CHAP. XII.

PORTUGAL.

PORTUGAL, the satellite of England, like all the powers of the second order, is hurried on by the vortex of her planet in the general commotion of Europe. The violent conduct of France to this power, the violation of the law of nations in the person of her ambassador, the insolence of the Directory in negotiating with her Court, the rigorous conditions they imposed,—all these motives ought to irritate the national honour of the Portuguese, who formerly possessed so great a share of it, and lay on them an indispensable obligation never to yield but to the last extremity.

The storm that threatens Portugal is furious, but there exist many chances in her favour. She ought at least to wait the result of the congress of Rastadt to decide. To seize the present with celerity is the true policy of the strong; to gain time is the only resource of the weak. Spain alone is unable to subjugate Portugal, while defended by an army of 40,000 men, and by double that number of militia, whose self-love is equally lofty with the proud and high-spirited Spaniards.

It is not even the interest of the Spanish Court to undertake alone an expedition against Portugal, that would absorb all her military strength, without affording a certainty of success. Should she unfortunately complete that conquest, she would excite the jealousy of France, and France would at least exact the cession of Brazil. Should she fail, which is far more probable, exhausted in the contest, she would lie at the mercy of the French. Should this war, once engaged

engaged in, continue for any length of time, as it probably would, France would *forcibly* join her unwelcome auxiliaries to the Spanish army, nor would Spain dare refuse her destructive aid.

The interest of Spain, then, is to act with caution towards Portugal, to seize every political means of temporizing, to avoid an open rupture that might force her into a war with this her natural ally, to restrain as long as possible the petulance of the French, and oppose to it her mediation, whereby the disputes between Portugal and France may be terminated without a blow.

The French Directory have long threatened to march an army through Spain, to the conquest of Portugal. She has now devoted to it a division of that of Italy. Under this pretext, Gen. Angereau has been deprived of the brilliant command of the army of the Rhine, to put himself at the head of that of the Pyrenees.

But France is not yet relieved from all her embarrassments on the rest of the continent, nor will she be relieved from them till the conclusion of the congress of Rastadt, whose result will either be peace to the empire, or a general war. The affairs of Rome afford new objects to her policy. Those of Switzerland employ an important division of her Italian army. The projected invasion of England engrosses the bulk of her forces. The Directory dare not leave either the interior or the metropolis of France in a defenceless state. It does not therefore appear that this is a favourable season for sending an army two hundred leagues from her frontiers, without the means of maritime communication.

The Court of Spain cannot, without equal repugnance and terror, behold a French army traverse her dominions, to attack Portugal. The
Directory

Directory are destitute of money for its support, and it must therefore be paid by Spain. That Court would be obliged to join them with her own troops, who would quickly be poisoned by the contact of these revolutionary soldiers. The Spaniards would either adopt the opinions of their preaching guests, or their indignation would be roused at their principles and their conduct. The Court of Spain would incur a risk either of the complete disorganization of her army and the defection of her democratized subjects, or the indignation of the people, who, remembering their long-accumulated grievances, of which the unfortunate war with England is not the smallest, would perhaps unite with the Portuguese to rid themselves of these odious auxiliaries. The Court would then be situated between two opposing revolutions, and must fall a victim to the one or to the other.

Spain, then, has the most important interest in frustrating, by every secret means, the projected expedition against Portugal. France, on the other hand, is forced to suspend the execution of her threats, at least till the conclusion of the congress of Rastadt. The danger therefore is not instant, and need not drive Portugal to measures that might debase, but could not save her. She ought to foresee, that should the projects of the French against England succeed, should they annihilate this powerful rival, and become masters of the sea, they will then resume the subordinate object of her destruction.

The colony of Cayenne, which is now the prison of the unfortunate of all parties whom the Directory and the Councils condemn to exile, till they themselves perhaps shall people it in their turn, is continually increasing on the continent of South America.

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The French have already stipulated, in the conditions of peace signed at Paris (though not ratified) a great augmentation of territory at the expense of the Portuguese colony of Brazil. The provinces of Para, Maragnon, and Siarra, which they have once possessed, lie convenient for their ambition, and would give them the rich and newly-discovered mines of Rio-Negro. This danger is very imminent. It may involve the loss of Brazil, and without Brazil Portugal would sink into nothing.

To avoid ruin in Europe, and the loss of her territories in America, Portugal has but one system to pursue. She must exhibit the greatest firmness, recruit her army, fortify her frontiers, persevere in her alliance with England, put her navy in the best condition, strengthen her means of defence, especially on the frontiers of Brazil towards Guiana, break into the nest of exiles in Cayenne, seize that colony while the English are yet masters of the sea, and bring back to Europe those exiles, whose appearance would cause considerable uneasiness, and perhaps more evil, to the Directory of France. This expedition, undertaken with suddenness and secrecy, could not fail to succeed. It would save Brazil, and excite the astonishment of Europe.

But this we cannot expect. All the nations who either have, or ought to have, combated France, seem to behold a Medusa's head, and are robbed of every power. It is difficult to defend ourselves with success when we know not how to attack with advantage.

Another plan which Portugal ought to observe is, to avoid all hostility with Spain, as well by sea as by land, as well in Europe as against her colonies; and this, were it from no other motive, in

order to loosen the bonds of her alliance with France, cause a distrust that might burst them asunder and restore Spain to her natural policy.

Whatever system Portugal may pursue, whether awaiting patiently her fate, or exhibiting energy and courage, her future lot depends on that of England, and consequently, on the result of the Congress of Rastadt; on a general war, or universal peace.

CHAP. XIII.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE United States, notwithstanding their similarity of principles and opinions, notwithstanding the interest they have taken in the revolution of France, their ready acknowledgement of the French Republic, the services they have rendered her during the whole course of the war, the marked preference they granted to her commerce, and even her privateers, were viewed as enemies from the moment they wished to be truly neutral, and have not escaped the declamations, the incendiary manœuvres, the insults of her envoys, the decrees of her councils, nor the plunder of her navy.

The extraordinary commissioners whom they sent to Paris to terminate their differences are in disgrace with the Directory, and their negotiation retarded; while their ships continue to be boarded

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and plundered, in order to force them to break their treaties with England, and to shut their ports to her commerce. It is easy however to prove that the advantages of their trade with England, entirely outweigh those derived from France. Should unavoidable circumstances, therefore, compel them to abandon their system of neutrality, their interest must determine them to declare for that country with whom they have so much analogy, and who, being no longer their mistress, has forgot her animosity.

It appears very impolitic in France to exasperate the peaceful Americans, and thus make them acquainted with their strength.—Beyond the reach of attack by land, should despair convert them into warriors, they may become the scourge of Europe. The Antilles, and the Colonies of the different powers are entirely at their mercy. They may easily starve and conquer them. They may put an end to the Newfoundland fishery. They may devastate the coasts of Europe by their privateers. Maritime war has charms for two great passions of human nature, avarice and the love of adventure. The preparations, the expences, the forces it requires, are of smaller magnitude than those by land, and their effects more lucrative and rapid.

The Americans have provisioned, and consequently saved the Colonies of France. That service alone, ought, in the eyes of the Directory, to have obliterated the frivolous grievances complained of, which if duly weighed were not injurious, but rather the just procedures of a prudent and pacific neutrality.

If the Americans are compelled to form a navy, and to mount their vessels with cannon, in order to make their flag respected, they will soon become

warriors. They will cease to be a passive nation. Their own safety will render them conquerors. The Gulph and Continent of Mexico, the Antilles and Newfoundland, will successively fall into their hands without resistance, and they will be well compensated for the insults that have so imprudently been offered them.

The interest of the Americans in order to support their pacific system and their flourishing commerce, demands the re-establishment of peace, on just and honourable conditions between France and England; and that if the one must have a decided superiority, it should be that power whose government is established on a basis peaceful to its neighbours, and especially to commercial nations.

The security then of America depends on that of England. She ought to dread the correlative effects of the threatened invasion. During the early part of the French revolution, the wishes and inclinations of the Americans were favourable to its success. But since the French have become ambitious conquerors, and greedy plunderers, every thing is changed. They have alienated from them every nation. And if England is conquered and disorganized, America will be compelled to cringe to the power of the French.

The fate of the United States depends then upon England, and consequently on the result of the Congress of Rastadt; on a general war with the French, or a universal peace.

CHAP. XIV.

H O L L A N D.

IN reflecting on the position of the Batavians, it appears doubtful, whether they should be considered as a nation constituting a separate body-politic or as an appendage, a mere department of France. Their government is unavoidably influenced by French councils. They enjoy the tranquillity of slavery, under the protection of a French general and a French army. Flushing is in the hands of that republic. And as a proof of their joint right, or rather of their sovereignty, they have on the 5th of February last established a Custom-house there, whose clerks are paid by France.

The Dutch are ruined by a community of political interests and commercial concerns with the French Republic. They have lately sacrificed a fleet, ordered from their ports by France, unwisely and unseasonably. They pay their own army which is kept in subjection by that of France.—They pay besides the army of France itself, which occupies all their forts.

This pretended liberty, cost them a hundred millions of livres, paid as a contribution to France; besides Dutch Flanders, Maestricht, many other towns to the left of the Meuse, Demerary, Essequibo, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and all their East India commerce, which fell a prey to the English.

The Dutch Republic was completely democratised on the 22d of February, 1798. That revolution was violently effected by the minority, as
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happens every where. The deputies who had the courage to remonstrate or abandoned their posts through delicacy, that they might not yield to force, have been treated as criminals and traitors to their country. Their Directory, similar to that of France, has been proclaimed through all the Provinces amid the acclamations of terror, or the hush of despair.

Is there a true Batavian who does not shudder with indignation, at being compelled to continue under the tyrannic yoke of such a liberty? Is there a Batavian but on a fair comparison, regrets the Stadtholdership he compulsively swears to hate? Can a nation be free that is not independent? Are the Batavians independent? Can they declare war or peace, remain neuter, or carry on a branch of trade without the consent of the French Directory? Can this commercial nation, to whose very existence neutrality is necessary, voluntarily cease to espouse the quarrels of France? Is she not compelled to submit to every law of the Directory in opposition to her own interests? Has she not even lately, in obedience to their orders, and with injury to herself, prohibited all English manufactures.

Does not the fate of the Batavian, like that of the French Republic, rest upon her Directory and councils? Is not the interest of the nation there, as well as in France, sacrificed to this execrable oligarchy? Is not the lot of the Batavians precarious like that of the French, excepting, that in France it depends on a nation who can change it when they please, while in Holland it is at the mercy of their conquerors? Is not Holland a democratic republic, solely because France is such? Should France receive a
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King, must not Holland immediately submit to a Stadtholder? Then what are the Batavians? Mere apes and beasts of burthen to France.—What a miserable existence!—Not daring to complain of their fate, destitute of power to ameliorate their condition, they groan in secret, and breathe their ardent vows in favor of their enemies against their imperious allies.

Should the expedition against England be completely successful, should this rival power of France against whom Holland unites her forces be destroyed, Holland will be ruined and annihilated. She will then have but one favor to ask her conquerors, to cease existing as a nation, and be incorporated in the grand republic: still fostering a hope, that some future avenger may spring up among them, when the excesses of the French shall have revolted all Europe, and when the æra shall have arrived that their crimes meet due punishment from the resentment of their numerous enemies.

Amid the dreadful evils produced in Holland by the French Revolution, it has however delivered the Batavians from that absurd federalism which divided the interests and the wills of her seven provinces. The union of the whole republic in one national and indivisible body, is an immense benefit which may one day prove the salvation of the Batavian people. It was even impolitic in France to favor a union, which in happier times may give that nation a concentric force, they did not possess before, and which never can exist in a federal constitution.

Whatever form of government futurity shall prepare for this nation, she ought to have the wisdom to preserve her national indivisibility. It would

would even be the interest of a Stadtholder, should that office be revived, thus to govern a united people.

The present, though not the future interest of Holland, appears connected with that of France, because her fate is involved in it. She wishes England to be humiliated, that she may be compelled to restore her conquests. Yet she would be far more certain of that restitution, were she detached from France by the re-establishment of the House of Orange.

But must not the Batavians fear, should the French succeed in destroying the power of the English, and become absolute masters of the sea that they would demand a part of the restored possessions, as for instance, the port of Trincomale in Ceylon, so uniformly coveted by the French, as a necessary naval station between the Isle of France, and the Coromandel Coast, or Bengal?

Should even the French have the generosity to restore them all their colonies, yet does not their establishment at P'lushing, their keeping possession of the keys of Holland, Maestricht, Breda, and Dutch Flanders, their opening the Scheldt, and their re-establishing the port of Antwerp, prove them the most dangerous enemies of Holland, both with regard to commerce and to war?

In alliance with the English, the Batavians may continue free and independent. In alliance with France, they will neither be the one nor the other. But it will be objected, that they are unable to change their destiny; that they have neither the power to quit the alliance with France, to declare themselves neuter, nor to unite with other nations, even by a mere treaty of commerce. This is too true;

true ; and this renders their fate the more deplorable, the more insupportable to her truest citizens.

It is only by a general war, productive of advantage to the enemies of France, that the Batavians can regain their colonies, their frontier towns, the port of Flushing, and their independence. It is true, they will, in that case, probably receive a Stadtholder. But the nation would be independent and free under her proper chief. order would spring up anew, commerce would again flourish, true citizens would breathe the air of freedom and of joy, and this happy revolution would only be productive of evil to a few miserable and outrageous democrats, who have been elevated by their turbulence, and the most audacious criminality, to the principal affairs of the state, of which none were so unworthy.

The fate then of the Batavians depends also on the result of the Congress of Rastadt, on a general war or universal peace.

CHAP. XV.

F R A N C E:

WHAT shall we say of this nation before whom the universe trembles, who destroys all the foundations of society, who treat all human institutions as puerile futilities, who hurried on from paradox to paradox, even to the denial of every first principle, have torn asunder the most sacred ties of nature, of religion, of marriage, and of filial and paternal love, as the chains of slavery, who preach the same dogmas by their armed missionaries, and at once plunder and revolutionise every nation.

To follow the disgusting career of crimes and horrors, that have stained these ferocious demagogues, would be to write a satire on mankind, and belongs but to the inflexible pen of history. To celebrate their victories and their heroes, would be a hateful flattery, that would outrage even the genius of poetry.

Let us view the French nation in their present existing point of view. Let us examine their conformation, their aggrandisement, their political and moral influence on the universe, the solidity or instability of their actual mode of existence, their external and internal dangers. And let us endeavour thence to foresee, what will be the ultimate result of their present relative position.

One great virtue has unfolded itself in France by this revolution, the exaltation of the mind. Surrounded on every side by enemies, the French have on every side presented an undaunted front. On

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every side they have displayed heroic courage, amazing wonderful talents, and a genius for resource. All the continental armies have fled before their warriors. They have ranged over the face of Europe in triumph, where French banners never waved before. The powers around, in consternation at their successes, their boldness, and their indefatigable perseverance, have each successively made a separate peace. That concluded by the Emperor was signed at the gates of Vienna by the title of King of Bohemia and Hungary.

CONGRESS OF RASTADT.

IT remains to make peace with the Germanic body. The numerous Plenipotentiaries of this political phantom are assembled in Congress at Rastadt, and domineered by two Plenipotentiaries of France, who answer in dry, laconic notes the humble and diffusive remonstrances of the Deputies of the Empire. The transactions of Rastadt are a mere political illusion. A double negotiation counterworks every thing there discussed. Each of the powers concerned have a political agent at Paris, who treats separately of the individual interests of his master, to the injury of the common cause. It was once said, that at the Council of Trent the Holy Ghost arrived in a Portmanteau. It is the same at Rastadt. The courier of Paris brings with him the political spirit that must decide on the fate of Germany.

Even were the Congress dissolved without coming to any conclusion, every thing would be the same. And this is what the most feeble members of the Germanic

Germanic body ought to desire, that at least they may have the consolation to protest against the system, and that their ruin may not be sanctioned by the juridical form of a pacific Congress.

The part performed by the German Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt is so debasing even to the primary powers, whose arrangements are made independently of its deliberations, that it is astonishing it should not yet have been dissolved.

The French have not only dictated the conditions of peace, but they have executed them before that peace is concluded. The possession of Mentz, of the Tête-de-pont of Mannheim, of Kehl, of Dusseldorf, and probably soon of Ehrenbreitstein, form a road to peace, because this formidable line paralyses the courage of those powers who might be tempted to resume their arms and arrest the course of French ambition. The Germanic body resembles a dying man, whose relations are dividing the succession with a foreign robber they are unable to repel or to eject.

The French Directory, in order to precipitate the conclusion of this peace, have just enforced it by an irresistible argument in the rapid revolution of Switzerland. Nothing could have been more sudden or less foreseen. A Lemanic republic was fabricated at Paris in an instant. The aristocracy of Bern, at once feeble and despotic like that of Venice, was totally unable to resist. The revolutionary spirit of democracy seized all the Cantons in a moment. Democracy has triumphed without an obstacle. This Helvetic revolution brings the revolutionary spirit to the heart of Germany, and every sovereign ought seriously to reflect on the example.

It required six or seven years of experimental progress for France to create a democratico-representative government. They have again been feeling their way in the formation of the Cisalpine and Ligurian republics. But now they have perfected themselves in the revolutionising art.—The democratic revolutions of the Batavian, Lemanic, and Trans-Jurane republics, are *chef-d'œuvres* of audaciousness and rapidity.

The French Directory may now partition Germany, as a surveyor divides an estate or a field into portions nearly equal. They may cut out a republic under the name of a neighbouring river or a mountain for each division, and they may send forth emissaries, who setting off from some point in its vicinity will instantly execute their orders. To municipalise, to departmentise, to establish provisionally, an executive directory, and national guards; to form primary assemblies for the election of representatives in both councils, to take possession of their public finances and the estates of the clergy; to confiscate every species of property belonging to aristocrats, that is, to the rich; to claim the protection of France, who has promised to grant it to every nation that dares aspire after liberty: These measures are now easy, sudden, and dreadful to all nations. It is a first principle of human nature to hate bonds, however soft, however just, however necessary.—Man loves independence, and he loves novelty.

These plans are ready prepared at Paris, and are well known. The impulse is already given, by seducing examples, slow and ill employed obstacles, and sovereigns panic-struck, paralyzed, and disunited. Should peace be concluded at Rastadt on the conditions dictated by France, a

few years will be sufficient to establish universal democracy. It will begin its progress by Germany, where it has already taken the deepest root.

The Congress of Rastadt can only be considered as a mere form of representation, its peace as made entirely at the expence of the empire, the Rhine as the boundary of the French republic, and Germany may take care of herself.

I T A L Y.

IT remains for France to regulate the affairs of Italy. She has now a pretext, whether accidental or premeditated, speedily to decide the fate of Theocratic Rome. Her existence must be insupportable to the worshippers of Reason, to Theophilanthropists, and Atheists. Were the Pope an antique, the Commissaries would convey him to Paris and display him in the national Museum. But they will only strip him of his dignity and his riches. The Romans will form a petty republic, at the instigation of the Gallo-Cisalpinians, and in their turn will stimulate the Neapolitans and Sicilians to form two other democratic republics.—The King of Sardinia, the Duke of Parma, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, will afterwards disappear, and make way for similar political institutions.

Italy will be distracted by the federal system, by wars between all these little states, poor, restless, and jealous; tributary as well as dependent on the great parent-republic; till some man of genius unite the whole nation then regenerated and re-disciplined, shake off the yoke of France, and make her repent her revolutionary mania.

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Such probably is the yet secret plan of the Directory with regard to Italy. Such is the future fate we may predict to that fine country. A general war with France alone can change this unavoidable, this concatenated series of events resulting from each other : this alone can reinstate Italy in her former situation.

P O R T U G A L.

FRANCE has yet to terminate her dispute with Portugal, in order to deprive England of the resources of her commerce and the asylum of her ports, especially of Lisbon. If Portugal were adjacent to the Pyrenees, her subjugation would be sudden and easy. But her distance raises obstacles which will be multiplied by the repugnance of Spain to behold a French army traversing her provinces and living at her expence in order to destroy this neighbouring kingdom.— In the chapters of Spain and Portugal are detailed the very important interests of these two countries in the prevention of that fatal project.

But no considerations can alter the plans of the French Directory. If they have resolved on this expedition, the French army will traverse Spain, the troops of that country will unite with it, the Court of Portugal will be panic-struck, and submit to every demand. The French general will enter Lisbon in triumph, return to Paris loaded with an immense booty, leave in Portugal and in Spain the germs of a democratic revolution, and Portugal will remain tributary to the French republic.

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Though the probability of this chain of events is almost demonstrable, yet were there a man of genius at the head of the Portuguese army, who could take every advantage of the topographical impracticability of his country, should the ancient honour of this nation, once so warlike, be awakened; should they receive a seasonable aid from England; they may continue the war for a length of time; contest, foot by foot, their mountains and numerous fortresses; ruin the French army; establish a jealousy and distrust between that and the Spanish troops; and, by an example of firmness, draw over the Spaniards to fight under their banners against their dangerous allies. They may cause unexpected and unaccustomed disgraces to tarnish the warriors of France, and make the Directory repent their imprudence in attempting at once two grand expeditions at the two extremities of Europe, and in carrying on a war at so remote a distance from their frontiers at the very time when they are engaged in an invasion of England; that principal object of their policy, whose success must be followed by the reduction of Portugal, while the accomplishment of this latter expedition can have no influence whatever on the projected descent on England.

ENGLAND.

IT still remains for France to attempt an expedition against England. The Directory, by means of extravagant declamations and accusations, have succeeded in irritating the nation against the English. Their avarice, which considers all the gold of Europe as accumulated in England, combines
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with the national hatred. The plan is laid, and will take place. Immense preparations continue to be made with extreme expence and profusion. Should the enterprize be given up, the public treasure is exhausted, the Directory is lost.

Buonaparte, the Scipio of France (destined perhaps to a similar fate) is charged with the destruction of the modern Carthage. Accustomed to success, the French do not foresee even the possibility of misfortune. In France no one doubts the event of this important expedition. It is a *coup de main* they are hastening to accomplish, because they are weary of a seven years war. It is conceived to be the seal of an universal peace, the basis of their democratic republic, and the end of all the calamities, which have never ceased to overwhelm France, from the moment of the revolution. It is the golden fleece, the crowning of all their victories, the price of all their blood that has flowed, the summit of their national glory.

This expedition, then, will take place, and probably about spring. Its facilities and its obstacles have been detailed in the chapter on England.—Should it succeed, the French Republic will be absolute mistress of the universe. All the governments of Europe will exist but at her pleasure.—They will all be her tributaries, and the French nation will have no enemies but itself, its pride; avarice, luxury, and immorality, its discord; inconstancy, and extravagant democracy.—It will have gone through, in a few years, all the gradations which the Roman republic passed in many ages, to arrive at the summit of power and a precipitate decline. Then this Colossus, too heavy for its chalky pedestal, will totter, and be broken to pieces in its fall.

Should

Should this expedition, however, be unsuccessful, which is very possible; should the invincible British fleet gain a decisive victory over the French, Spanish, and Dutch fleets, whether combined or separate; should the English nation, proud, and energetic as the French, equally animated by patriotism and national dislike, repulse the French army soon after it has landed, should they destroy it, force it to reembark with loss, or cut off its communication with the sea, should they weaken, harass, or reduce it to famine, and render this great expedition abortive, which, on a large scale, can only be once attempted, and may partially or altogether fail in the execution, then France is totally ruined; all her laurels withered; her allies will abandon and turn against her; the other powers of Europe will attack her on every side; she will have lost the flower of her warriors, and the reputation of her arms; she will be without money; and internal discord will complete her destruction.

Another danger peculiar to the Directory and its two submissive Councils, will result from the despair and vengeance of those troops, who will regard themselves as sacrificed to the temerity and ambition of this detested oligarchy. These soldiers, now the sole support of its tyrannic power, will turn against it, and be urged on by the general wish of the nation. It is at Paris they will seek the rewards and the plunder promised them in England. The generals themselves will either be the first victims of the excusable fury of the troops, or will partake of their indignation and their revolt.

It is not even necessary, in order to hasten this military explosion against the present government, that the descent on England should terminate by a catastrophe disgraceful to the French. Its

being retarded too long, or abandoned, after being so emphatically announced, is sufficient. The assemblage of so many idle soldiers, whom they will be unable to pay, when their treasures shall be wasted by this expensive delusion, will equally excite their indignation, and urge them to the same excesses.

The Directory appears to foresee this danger, and we may consider the decree lately passed, re-instituting the national guards, as a precaution against the insurrection of the armies. Yet it was for moving this truly constitutional decree that the unfortunate exiles of the 18th Fructidor (4th Sept. 1797) were declared traitors to their country.

That revolution was brought about by the bayonet, and by the bayonet will the present government be destroyed.

The chimerical *milliard* in land, with which the troops were imprudently flattered and appeased, has already been converted, by a decree, into annuities for life. But can it be believed they will be satisfied with an exchange of real and immoveable property, into an arbitrarily distributed pension, during life, to be paid, like other pensions and annuities, with deductions, delays, or unprofitable effects?

Besides, if the thousand millions of livres be not reserved in landed estates, upon what will this enormous mass of annuities be charged? And what will be the effect, should they even be able to fulfil the decree? Instead of making this valuable class of brave warriors, cultivators of land, and fathers of families, they will convert them into a mass of lazy annuitants, celibatists by necessity, and consequently either useless or dangerous, while the country will be overburdened with inhabitants. The nation ought not to have been deceived, much less the soldiers. The latter will revenge themselves,
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and their assemblage for the expedition against England, and the return of the other armies on account of the continental peace, will furnish them with the opportunity.

This is the dangerous game the Directory are playing in their project for the invasion of England!

INTERNAL DANGERS.

LET us next examine the internal dangers by which France is threatened. The whole nation hates and despises the present Government; but they are restrained by fear of a new system of blood, to which the government would have recourse against a general insurrection. Partial revolts are continually arising in all the departments, but without plan, without skilful leaders, without connection. They are uniformly discovered, and always suppressed by the massacre of their authors. Yet they continually spring up anew. This proves there exists a general fermentation, a general indignation in the people.

Democracy reigns only in the most miserable and most turbulent part of the nation. Men of property, industrious artificers and husbandmen, hold it in abhorrence. And though this sect is fortunately a minority, their activity supplies the place of numbers, and multiplies their force. It furnishes spies, informers, executioners, assassins, missionaries, declaimers, and preaching politicians. It is most turbulent and most furious in the primary assemblies, where it silences or drives away all good citizens, becomes absolute master of the elections, and has long sent

members taken from its bosom to compose both the Councils.

Democracy infects the armies, which are not as in the ancient republics chosen from among the citizens, but a mixture of all nations. Most of the generals are devoted to it, or at least find no security but in appearing so. It is by this democratic influence that the armies are alienated from the nation, and have hitherto shewn no attachment but to the government, by whom they have been purchased.

The French soldiers are, therefore, as much dreaded by their countrymen, as by the nations with whom they are at war. They seem in their native country to be living in a hostile territory. They are fed gratuitously; they accuse every man of aristocracy; they pillage, threaten, and insult, and at Paris more than elsewhere, display their licentious severity. But when the greater part of them shall return to their homes, when disoccupation and discontent shall make them acquainted with the murmurs of their countrymen, when they shall again have a common interest, they will turn their backs on a government that deludes them with ample promises and scanty recompenses; and after having been the instruments of oppression, they will become the means of deliverance.

This æra, however, appears very remote, while Frenchmen are moving rapidly along the torrent of revolution. And by what will the present government be succeeded? By a government equally vicious, which will be followed by another and another, till, from change to change, the nation shall discover that they are too numerous, too fond of glory, luxury, pleasure, and enjoyment, to exist for ever under a ferocious system of democracy,

cracy, that produces only exacerbation, frenzy, turbulence, faction, and crimes; destroys security both of person and property, tears asunder every social tie, insolently and barbarously tyrannises in the name of liberty, overthrows many times in a year its contemptible demagogues, raises others still more detestable, recruits the population of France exhausted by its convulsions, by war, and by massacres; by emigration, banishment, and transportation, with the scum of all the nations of the world: disguises political equality under the most disgusting appearances of a savage fraternization; destroys and plunders with the most barbarian licentiousness in the name of the country, and holding up to the present generation an example of every vice, gives their rising progeny a ferocious and infocial education.

The French will, at length, be wearied with being the scourge and the terror of other nations, when they might, become the object of their love and future hopes. All these evils spring from their present government, from its restlessness, its mistaken policy, its ambition, its incapacity, and above all, from the necessity to its existence of disturbing every state and every city with its democracy, both in their internal and external relations.

The uneasiness of the Government is evident in the continual marches and counter-marches of troops across the Republic, in the enormous expences of secret corruption of spies and of informers, in the choice of commissaries of the executive power, and its agents in foreign countries, in the intolerable persecution of the unfortunate relations of Emigrants, who remain in France, in the election of men accused or convicted of crimes,

crimes, by whom they are surrounded, and whom they employ ; in fine, in all the springs and movements of their gloomy tyranny.

Their false policy is demonstrated by their mania for republicanising around them, for uniting nations once divided by federalism, and for placing in the hands of the peaceful those arms they will one day turn against France. It is demonstrated by the hazardous measures of a war with Portugal, and of invading England, and by sacrificing in direct violation of the French constitution itself, the liberty of an ancient republic which they consign to the despotism of the Austrian monarch : while, by their aggrandisement, they render that potentate formidable to the new republics they have themselves founded in Italy. It is demonstrated by the union of the Helvetic League in one single body, to which they thereby give a force of concentration, what will one day prove dangerous to France, while the latter might have found in the federal weakness of Switzerland, a pledge of security for one third of her Eastern frontiers.

Their ambition is evident, in the abuse they make of their victories to incorporate in the republic by violence, nations on the left bank of the Rhine, who shew the strongest repugnance to the association ; in the violation of the suspension of arms by seizing Mentz, Manheim, Ehrenbreitstein, and the Bishopric of Basil : in the department created at Corfu, that keystone of new revolutionary projects against the Turk and his allies ; in the avarice, the insolence, and the rigorous severity with which they treat all nations, particularly their good allies the Americans ; in their piracies on neutral ships, sanctioned
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by a decree no less injurious to themselves; in fine, in all those abuses of power, whose unavoidable effect is ultimately to produce a general insurrection of all nations against France.

Their incapacity is proved by the enormity of their expences, which compel them continually to that very stock-jobbing *agiotage* against which they complain, and which they sometimes pretend to persecute: expences which make them dependent on their contractors, whose rapid fortunes and shameless luxury discovers to an indignant nation the gulphs that have swallowed up their treasures. It is proved by the impossibility of giving account of the enormous contributions collected in Holland, in Italy, and in Germany, which, if well managed, might have sufficed for the whole war, and spared the specie they have sent out of the country: by the prodigious number of their decrees, laws, and contradictory proclamations, all destitute of effect; by the destruction of the ancient worship pursued with so much fury, and to which they have substituted Pagan feasts, not only puerile and insignificant, but holding up the vilest prostitutes to popular adoration, as the type of the Deity: in fine, by the national corruption of manners, and universal immoralisation, &c. &c!!

The victories of the nation, and her military glory, are the work of the French soldiers, and of the spirit, the courage, the patriotism of the nation. All the calamities that attend that military glory, without being compensated by its advantages, arise from the defects of their government. The constitution is essentially good; but it is neither known nor observed. There ought no longer to exist in France, either aristocracy or democracy. Nothing ought

to exist, but their country and its citizens. This nickname of democracy, is the watchword of Jacobins, of Sans Culottes, of Terrorists. It is ever the same sect, makes the same advances, and produces the same effects.

A principal danger that threatens France, is the too great extention of her boundaries. The Germans, whom she has grafted in her stock, have an avowed detestation for this union. Never will their simplicity accord with the metaphysical subtilities, the shameless immorality of Paris. They will ever be Germans at heart, and frequently must they be treated as enemies. In the wars with Germany, they will always take part against France, at least in inclination. We may declare almost as much of the unfortunate Belgians they have so heavily oppressed, and of the Batavians, who are rather the subjects than the allies of France. Savoy, and the county of Nice, part but to dissolve the bond of fraternity by which they are enchained.

Every wise political speculator, every man skilful in military affairs, every one who loves justice, even in France, have protested against this extention of territory. The German Plenipotentiaries at Rastadt shrewdly observed, that the Rhine was no barrier against invasion; for Germans could pass it every where, when and how they pleased.

All the politicians of France observed, that so great an extent of territory would oblige that country to keep up too strong an army; would render the republic too military, cause it too many wars, and expences, and might one day hold out to ambitious generals a temptation,

temptation, and facilitate the means to overturn the republic.

Men eminent for military skill said, the ancient frontiers of France were complete and perfect, being protected by two lines of impregnable fortresses. That if political reasons rendered it necessary to extend their limits, it was absolutely according to the rules of tactics, to take the Meuse for a boundary, because the extent of defence between Maestricht and Luxemburg was concentrated, narrow, and easy; but that to carry their defensive lines to the banks of the Rhine was tactically dangerous.

The Advocates of Justice exclaimed, that it would infringe the rights of man, violate the principles of the constitution, and trample on the national oaths, to force the inhabitants of other states to be incorporated in the French republic, without consulting them, and contrary to their inclination. That it was contrary to good faith, and ridiculous, to proclaim a renunciation of conquest, at the very moment when they were most grossly abusing the right of superior strength. But these advocates were the least attended to.

Were the people really consulted in the assemblies; that people who is continually declared to be the sovereign, while they are compelled to obey an arbitrarily will; were the people asked, "Will you retain your conquests, though
 " in swearing to the constitution you have re-
 " nounced all wish to conquer? You are now to
 " receive and incorporate in your bosom nations who
 " abhor this union, whom you will often be com-
 " pelled to treat as slaves rather than as brethren,
 " and in consequence of this injustice, be obliged
 " to continue the war, and have a general war ex-
 p " cited

“ cited against you?” The nation would have unanimously replied, “ Our choice is justice, our “ ancient boundaries and peace.”

The greatest danger that threatens France, that which will necessarily produce a decisive revolution, though it is not yet foreseen by what steps it will arrive, is the irremediable disorder of the finances. This evil attaches to the democratic form of administration, in every branch of public economy. The confusion of powers, the multitude of persons of all conditions employed, the default of payments, the impunity attending it, the necessity of doing every thing by contractors, the anticipations of revenue, all the ancient vices of finance, have swelled and multiplied by the folly of their legislators.

The taxes, according to the acknowledgement of the financiers of the republic, do not exceed 616,000,000 livres. They have now re-established the immoral tax of lotteries. They have already dared to propose the gabelle. They have attempted to renew the farming of tobacco. They will, perhaps, for a short period draw inconsiderable tributes from some resifless European nations; but that source will soon be exhausted, it will soon become a bitter spring.

Should the total of their revenues amount to 8, or even 900,000,000 livres, they will always in time of peace, and exclusive of extraordinary expences, want more than 200,000,000 to balance the receipt and the expenditure. But we must also observe, that the immense arrears of taxes, which amounted at the end of 1797, to thirteen hundred millions, proves that they are very ill paid. We may add that above a third of their amount does not arrive in the national treasury,
but

but remains in the Departments, to defray the departmental and municipal expences, &c. For these are in fact so many states within the state. In finance the Republic is federal.

How can they supply this deficit? And what will be the effect should France, by her unwise policy or the ambition of her Directory, be engaged in a general war.

The government acknowledges, that the preparations for the English Invasion form already an extraordinary expence of 200 millions. In 1779, the shadow of a similar descent, which only employed 30,000 men and a space of three months, cost 80 millions extraordinary. The present is more than treble in proportion to the time, the number of men, and the vessels employed. The government has therefore deceived itself, if it does not calculate on 200,000,000 per month.

Should the enterprize succeed, England will reimburse these expences, and a very large mass of specie besides will go from England to France. But the Directory will enjoy no greater financial ease. The waste of money will be more considerable, yet economy and a balance in their finances will never be re established. Many individuals will grow too rich: the state will still be poor. The French will by this success be led into a course of new conquests, and new wars, which will end in effecting their ruin.

On the other hand, should this enterprize prove abortive, whether it be prevented by the rupture of the Congress of Rastadt, and followed by a general war, or by a junction with England, of the northern powers and America, whom the privateering of France, and her very impolitic decree against the free navigation of neutral

vessels, have irritated, and who are so deeply interested in the preservation of the English constitution and naval power, and in preventing the French, in particular, from becoming masters of the sea, or whether the English repel and frustrate the project, France will be ruined and lost, and the Directory, and the councils, her acolytes and high priests, will speedily sink beneath the national vengeance.

France, then, is not secure from the calamities she accumulates so unjustly and even so imprudently on the rest of Europe; nor from those still greater evils that menace her. Her imperious and incendiary conduct raises terror and indignation among all nations. She will one day reproach herself for it, even should she not become its victim. She herself is exposed to many dangers, from which she can only be secured by the greatest wisdom and moderation. She has the advantage over the rest of Europe of being sole mistress of her own fate. Good sense bids her change her policy, and, to insure her own safety, give peace to the universe.

It is not, however, by exciting their fears, that we can influence the French nation. It is by their generosity, by their magnanimity by that very elevation of soul which has exalted them above all the people of Europe, that they are to be invoked.

These, then, are the conditions imposed on the French by their glory, by universal justice, and by their own constitution:

1. To restrain the inquietude of the Cisalpines, and, by amicable measures, restore tranquility to the rest of Italy.

2. To restore to the Helvetic league the bishopric of Basil, which they have no right to retain,
and

and to emancipate their decisions. To grant simply her good offices to the Lemanic republic, since she alone has favoured and excited that insurrection. To withdraw her projected Transjurane constitution and her 30,000 men, since 30,000 men are sufficient to subjugate the Swiss.

3. To abandon the boundary of the Rhine, and exchange it for the Meuse: and on that basis of moderation conclude peace with the empire. And to engage not to interfere in the disputes that may arise out of the peace of Campo-Formio, or the seizing of Saltzburg and part of Bavaria by the Emperor.

4. To grant Portugal the same moderate conditions of peace she has concluded with the Court of Naples: that is, perfect neutrality.

5. To rescind her tyrannical decree against the free navigation of neutral vessels, equally prejudicial to her own commerce and that of England, and which so severely exasperated the neutral powers.

6. To announce to all Europe an unlimited armistice by land and by sea, to continue till the perfect conclusion of the definitive treaty between herself, Spain, and Holland, on the one hand, and England on the other.

7. To demand and accept the mediation of the maritime powers for mutual restitution and indemnities, between herself, Spain, and Holland, on the one hand, and England on the other; and for the conclusion of a definitive and universal peace.

Doubtless no nation in Europe, either present or future, can ever imagine that, in the present triumphant state of the French, fear or weakness have led them to this just moderation. On the contrary,

trary, they will be persuaded that, faithful to their constitutional principle and their oaths, they are desirous to exhibit to other nations an example of generosity and of justice. All the world will admire this extraordinary nation. They will gain universal love, obliterate all their errors, silence all their enemies, secure their liberty and their constitution, and lay the foundation of their own happiness in that of the universe. After having conquered Europe, the French have nothing left but to conquer themselves. If they neglect that victory, they will resemble all other nations; if they achieve it, they will be a nation without a parallel.

But the Directory will object, that France has made great disbursements, that she is without money, and that she must be indemnified.

A highwayman was taken. The judge asked him why he robbed. He answered, he had exhausted an ample fortune, and he could no longer live without robbing. He was hanged.

This apologue applies to the Directory, and the Directory alone. The French nation have been punished for their faults by those faults themselves. They are great, noble, and susceptible of every virtue. In many respects they deserve to be happy: they will be so. They will be the fabricators of their own fate: they will punish the criminals who have misled them; will adopt a wise constitution, just laws, and a stable government. Then will they enjoy the tranquillity of which the disturbances they have caused, have robbed the universe.

CONCLUSION.

THIS speculative Sketch affords a hasty idea of the political situation of the fifteen Powers, who by their reciprocal relations, their interests, their manners and commercial connections, are constituted a kind of body politic, named, by Voltaire, the Great *European Republic*. One individual member of that association at this decisive epocha excites against itself the united wishes and interests of the fourteen others, whom it has terrified by its ambition, its avarice, and above all, its disorganizing fury. Unfortunately there exists no tribunal to judge and punish the crimes of nations. War, horrid war! is the last and only resource of countries that are oppressed. And it is only by becoming oppressors in their turn, that they can arrest the military and revolutionary progress of the conquering nation. It is impossible even for philanthropy to reflect on the present political crisis, without breathing out her universal good will to man in curses against human nature.

The war, which the major part of Europe waged against France, at the beginning of the revolution, was unjust, impolitic, and imprudent. Had the confederates even succeeded in restoring the unfortunate Louis XVI. to the throne, he himself would have been punished by his allies for the rebellion of his subjects. For they had already agreed on the partition of his frontier domains. In this horrid war every thing has been miscalculated as well as the individual interest of each of the Belligerent powers. Philosophy, justice,

and philanthropy, poured out their vows for the French nation, and had it fallen, liberty would have been banished from the surface of the globe. Despotism would have exterminated even the liberty of thought.

But the victories of France have produced the contrary and more fatal extreme. And the strongest barrier must necessarily be opposed to it, to restore the reign of moderation; the sole permanent basis of social order and existence. The liberty of thought is become a mad phrensy that has changed the nature of every principle. Customs, manners, civil laws, moral obligations, religion, the Deity himself, every thing has been confounded by these innovators, with those prejudices and abuses, which separating men at a distance from each other, were condemned by reason and by nature. The French have overturned every thing. The passions have felt that they were uncontrouled by any restraint, and have acquired new strength by every victory. Vengeance, ambition, avarice, and immorality, have every where pursued and infamised their triumphs.

Liberty is the first gift of nature, and equality the second. Society modifies these innate and natural rights. She measures them by her political scale, she supports and represses them by the laws. The people constitute the social body. They make the laws either directly or indirectly. They are the Sovereign. But as all cannot exercise the sovereignty over all, the social body delegates its power. And thus are formed all our political institutions from despotism down to democracy. Both extremes of the social order are equally vicious. In the first the people are too little; in the second they are too much.

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Power renders man corrupt. And the more that power is multiplied, the greater is the number that are depraved. Despotism presents one tyrant, democracy a million. A monarch must die, but the people suffer no demise. The Despot reposes and sleeps at frequent intervals. He may repent, he may correct his conduct. None of these changes happen to demagogues. The turbulence that has raised them to the highest offices, besieges them when they are in possession, and soon effects their downfall.

Is democracy then the true system of liberty and equality? No: For it elevates and abases too suddenly and too great a number of individuals to preserve the social level. All Frenchmen agree they are now less free than they were under the ancient monarchy. All agree their government itself is not free; all are convinced it cannot be permanent.

It is precisely these three passive opinions that suffer democracy to continue, because it subdues them by an active tyranny. It requires either a decisive resolution, or a great and unavoidable catastrophe to change this state of anarchy; for such we may justly call the government of the multitude. If a decisive resolution produce not a great national event, the catastrophe will certainly take place. But it is better it should arise from internal causes than from external force.

The French revolution is not yet concluded. It cannot be concluded as long as the democratic system impresses it with its characteristic violence, fluctuation, and versatility. It will be concluded when the nation shall be well convinced by fatal experience, that to make use of its sovereignty is either impossible, or pernicious to the people;

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that

that it ought to be constitutionally delegated, sacred, and irrevocable, as long as its depositary, the executive power conforms to constitutional laws and causes them to be obeyed; that the maxim which calls insurrection the most sacred of duties, 'is an abominable and atrocious dogma, giving birth and impunity to crimes; that a national representation ought always to be near the executive power, to watch over the preservation of the constitution, over peace and war, taxation, receipts and expenditure, and more particularly over the execution of the laws; the security of persons and property, and above all, the public morals; but, that it should neither oppose nor usurp the governing power, nor be continually enacting new laws, rendered contemptible by their multiplicity.

To charge the representative body with the enactment of laws, is confounding objects the most distinct. Doubtless the legislature of a nation ought to be separated from its representation. The best laws have been made by a single legislator or a small number of wise men. It is the duty of the executive to suggest, according to its wisdom and experience, the necessity of every new law. The representative body ought then to debate its utility and its dangers. A legislative body, composed of a very few members, should prepare it; and the representative body should cause it to be sanctioned by the nation collectively in their primary assemblies. The same ought to be the mode of periodical revision and reform, whether of the constitutional act or of the ancient decrees.

It has been proved by history, that a nation may long exist with glory, happiness, and prosperity,

city, without a constitution, without any thing but a government. In fact, it would be far better to live without the former than be robbed of the latter.

But when, after experiencing a great revolution, a nation renews its social contract, it first creates a constitution, and by means of that constitution it forms a government. Whatever be its denomination that government ought to be firm, active, and respected. A wise constitution, sanctioned by the people, is their support and protection; the laws are their strength, and the representative body their guardian.

The French have but a step to arrive at this degree of perfection, the highest, whose attainment we have reason to hope or expect in human institution. To arrive at this they require but a wise reform in their constitution of 1795, which should be made deliberately, gradually, and by a legislative body well composed, of but few members, and above all in the calm of tranquillity.

They ought to establish the Government or Executive as speedily as possible; to invest it with high authority, make it obedient to the laws, and superior to every other power. It must be constituted for a long term, and clothed with majesty and lustre. As long as the executive power shall be drawn from the representative body, and not possess a character of superiority, it will want dignity and strength. As long as it is elective it will be upon a level with those it ought to command, too changeable, too easily overthrown. In fine, as long as it shall be divided, a defect not provided against in the constitution, and which had nearly caused a civil war,

this division will end in the tyranny of the boldest or the most artful.

France will discover, that constitutional monarchy is the government which best combines nature and reason. It is the most ancient, the most simple, the wisest, and in fine the most free, for a populous, rich, and industrious nation.—Woe to the Prince who should refuse an offer of such a monarchy, woe to the nation that should prefer to such a government democratic anarchy. The French feel all these arguments. They will apply them. They will, of their own accord, re-establish on a solid basis constitutional monarchy, which will be their only resource to rise above the chaos with which they are already disgusted.

This example will be useful to other nations and to sovereigns, because on either side experience will produce a reconciliation between the rights of the one and the power of the other; between necessary prejudices and the prudence of wisdom. Princes and nations ought, for their own welfare, to oppose the strongest barrier to that democratic disorganisation which the armies of France send before them into the field.

Let them behold the Batavians ruined by the false liberty which the French have sold them for 100,000,000 florins, and their most important fortresses. Let them behold Italy irreparably plundered of her most invaluable riches, and torn by anarchy and civil war; Switzerland disorganized and loaded with contributions, the miserable inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine bathing in tears the tri-coloured ribbands that chain them to a nation they abhor, and which tear them from their native country, their national customs and manners, their religion and their principles.—

These

These are the fruits of democratic perturbation, these the excesses into which it has precipitated a once generous nation !

This torrent should be opposed with a wall of brass. The shame and calamities with which the French menace all Europe, can be repelled by arms alone. Should peace be concluded at Rastadt on the conditions so imperiously dictated by the Directory, Europe is ruined. All the nations of Europe, then, ought to confederate anew, not to conquer, but to compel the French to return to the principles of their constitution.

This confederacy ought to be composed of the nations who still retain their freedom, against that power which persecutes and threatens them all. Spain, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland are chained to the car of the conqueror. Turkey is a nullity. France must be opposed by an offensive and defensive alliance between Prussia, Austria, the Empire, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and America : and, if possible, the King of Naples, Switzerland and Turkey should be induced to accede to it.

This league should annul every thing that has been done at Rastadt. It should absolutely oppose the invasion of England by a direct mediation, or by war if necessary. It should impose on the belligerent powers a rigorous armistice, and attack with their forces the party that refuses to comply.

The congress of Rastadt must cease to be a contemptible convention, where the members of the Germanic body are on the point of signing the national opprobrium and the destruction of the empire. It should be adjourned to a town more secure from the insults of the French. It should become a congress of the whole world. It should debate with frankness and sincerity the interests

terests of the fifteen powers described in this speculative sketch; and their political existence should be secured on a just and solid basis. It should terminate in universal peace.

With regard to the French nation, they are at present absolute masters of their own fate and of that of the world. They may adorn themselves with the most brilliant glory, and merit the gratitude and admiration of all nations; or they may, by persisting in a system of conquest and revolution, deluge the world with calamity, and produce their own ultimate ruin. On their choice of this alternative depends the destiny of the universe.

FINIS.

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